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The United Nations, INTERPOL, and others have urged the
international community to increase transparency in fisheries
management because illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
(“IUU”) continues its pervasive and destructive influence on the longterm conservation of fish stocks. Yet, IUU fishers are abetted by the lack of
transparency within regional fisheries management organizations
(“RFMOs”). For example, none of the RFMOs assessed in this Article—
the IATTC, ICCAT, NPFC, and WCPFC—require identification of the
beneficial vessel owners, thus allowing vessel owners to hide behind the
veil of shell corporations and making prosecution for fisheries offenses
extremely difficult. None make vessel monitoring data publicly available,
and only the WCPFC requires submission of operational data needed by
fisheries managers in order to accurately assess fish stocks. None are
transparent about compliance matters, making it impossible to verify
whether deterrent-level penalties are assessed against vessels found to be
in noncompliance with conservation and management measures. To
combat IUU fishing, arrest the continuing decline of fish stocks, and
enhance the long-term conservation of fish stocks, RFMOs must increase
transparency and, given the current state of global fish stocks, accelerate
the speed with which they develop more transparent processes. With
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greater transparency, the veils of secrecy that hide IUU fishing in Earth’s
vast oceans will begin to fall, bringing those fishers operating in the
shadows into the light.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The global catch of fisheries resources is massive and
continues to grow. Total production of fisheries resources rose
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from 145.9 million tonnes in 2009 to 178.5 million tonnes in
2018,1 with a total first sale value of US$401 billion.2 Global
exports of fish products have also continued to grow at roughly
8% per year, and reached US$164 billion in 2018.3 In the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean, home to perhaps the most valuable
fisheries in the world, fishers earned more than US$5billion, and
the total catch retailed for more than $22.68 billion in 2014.4
Fishing and aquaculture are also critical sources of food and
livelihoods: 10% to 12% of the global population relies on
fisheries resources for their livelihoods,5 and 3.3 billion people
depend on fish products for nearly 20% of their intake of animal
proteins.6 Global fisheries are clearly “among the most critical
industries for food security, poverty relief and human prosperity
worldwide.”7
Yet, the sustainability of the catch and food security for
millions is undermined by pervasive illegal, unreported and
unregulated (“IUU”) fishing. Researchers estimate that
somewhere between US$10 million and US$23.5 billion is lost
each year to IUU fishing,8 with some considering the US$23.5
billion figure to be a conservative estimate.9 IUU fishers have
preyed on the Pacific region, home to small island developing
States that are dependent on fisheries resources; IUU fishing in
1. See FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2016, at 4, tbl. 1
(2016), http://www.fao.org/publications/sofia/2016/en/ [https://perma.cc/N9S8RK4B]; FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2020, at 3, tbl. 1
(2020),
http://www.fao.org/3/ca9229en/ca9229en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52F78SKQ].
2. FAO 2020, supra note 1, at 2.
3. See id. at 8.
4. See Netting Billions: A Valuation of Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/fact-sheets/2016/09/netting-billions-a-valuation-of-tuna-in-the-western-andcentral-pacific-ocean [https://perma.cc/7C46-GLNH].
5. FAO, THE STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2014, at 32
(2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HD5-W6T8].
6. FAO 2020, supra note 1, at 5.
7. NAFIG & INTERPOL, Chasing Red Herrings: Flags of Convenience and the Impact on
Fisheries
Crime
Law
Enforcement,
at
14
(2017),
https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/5146/file/Chasing%20Red%20Herri
ngs%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U94Z-UTQT].
8. David J. Agnew et al., Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing, PLOS ONE
Feb.
25,
2009,
at
1,
4,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004570
[https://perma.cc/YE7C-PP9Q].
9. See, e.g., Chasing Red Herrings, supra note 7, at 13.
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the tuna fisheries alone costs these small Pacific island nations
approximately US$600 million each year.10 An assessment of the
Pacific Ocean’s six major fishing areas indicates that roughly 24%
of the total catch is unreported, with lost gross revenues of US$4.3
billion to US$8.3 billion per year.11
IUU fishing destabilizes food security,12 diminishes fisheries
resources,13 and undermines monitoring, control, and
surveillance (“MCS”) regimes of regional fisheries management
organizations (“RFMOs”).14 Although concerns about IUU
fishing typically focus on fishing by vessels flagged by nonmember States, the vessels of RFMO members also engage in IUU
fishing, all to the detriment of those fishing legally. For fisheries
managers, IUU fishing of all types “adds pressure to already
overexploited fish stocks, while simultaneously compromising
efforts to rebuild them based on scientific advice.”15
IUU fishers are abetted by the lack of transparency within
RFMOs. For example, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (“WCPFC”) allows member States to include

10. See MRAG ASIA PACIFIC, TOWARDS THE QUANTIFICATION OF ILLEGAL,
UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED (IUU) FISHING IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION, § 3.1,
36
(2016),
https://www.ffa.int/files/FFA%20Quantifying%20IUU%20Report%20%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC74-EMV2] (estimating the total volume of IUU
caught tuna in the Pacific region at 306,440t with an ex-vessel value of $616.11 million).
11. See Manaswita Konar et al., The Scale of Illicit Trade in Pacific Ocean Marine
Resources 1 (Oct. 2019) (Working Paper: World Resources Institute),
www.wri.org/publication/scale-illicittrade-pacific-ocean
[https://perma.cc/JAD9KWM6].
12. See Food and Agric. Org. United Nations [FAO], Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated
Fishing,
1
(2016),
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6069e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5B78-RFCY] (“IUU fishing therefore threatens livelihoods,
exacerbates poverty, and augments food insecurity.”).
13. Id. (“Fisheries resources available to bona fide fishers are poached in a ruthless
manner by IUU fishing, often leading to the collapse of local fisheries, with small-scale
fisheries in developing countries proving particularly vulnerable.”).
14. See generally Food and Agric. Org. United Nations [FAO], Implementation of
the International Plan of Action to Deter, Prevent and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, §§ 7–8 FAO Technical Guideline for Responsible Fisheries 9
(2002), http://www.fao.org/3/a-y3536e.pdf [https://perma.cc/S38T-9JGW].
15. Environmental Justice Found. et al, Achieving Transparency and Combating IUU
Fishing in RFMOs, Reinforcing the EU’s Multilateral Actions to Promote Best Practices, 3 (May
2019),
https://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/rfmo_report_en_may2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M55-M6W4].

2021]

COMBATTING IUU FISHING

971

fisheries data in a non-public portion of their annual reports.16 At
the national level, some member States, including Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and other Asian States, have argued that
privacy laws prevent them from providing operational level data
to the WCPFC.17 As a result of this lack of transparency, it is
difficult to assess compliance with the WCPFC’s conservation and
management measures (“CMMs”), total catch levels, and the
validity of any catch limits.18
For these reasons, this Article assesses the provisions of
relevant RFMOs that may implicate transparency and privacy
concerns: vessel registration, vessel monitoring systems (“VMS”),
vessel-based catch landing data, and compliance monitoring.19 In
particular, it describes the responsibilities of members of the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (“IATTC”),20
16. WCPFC, Rules and Procedures for the Protection, Access to, and Dissemination of Data
Compiled
by
the
Commission,
¶¶
23–24,
App.
2
(Dec.
2007),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/300/download?token=FKgU-U7b
[https://perma.cc/E9DA-C76] (stating that Part 2 of the Annual Report is an example
of non-public domain data).
17. See generally Chris Wold et al., Bringing Pacific Bluefin Tuna Back from The Brink:
Ensuring the Submission of Operational Data to The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
J.
ENVTL.
&
ADMIN.
L.
239
(2016),
Commission,
6
MICH.
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1059&context=mjeal
[https://perma.cc/36VV-ZQMU].
18. See id. at 245-47.
19. Other transparency issues have been discussed in other articles. See, e.g., Chris
Wold & Alfred “Bubba” Cook, Shining a Light on High Seas Transhipment: The Need to
Strengthen Observer Reporting of Transhipments in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission, 26 HASTINGS ENVTL. L. J. 183 (2020) (describing the need for onboard
observers to monitor high seas transshipment of fish from a fishing vessel to a carrier
vessel). In addition, it is well known that the placement of onboard observers on longline
vessels is woefully inadequate. See, e.g., Greenpeace, Briefing to TCC10, WCPFC-TCC102014-OP07,
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC-TCC10-2014OP07%20Greenpeace%20briefing%20paper%20to%20TCC10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LJH-QW7M] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (“observer coverage on
longline vessels, at only around 2%, is woefully inadequate.”).
20. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, Costa Rica-U.S., May 31, 1949, 80
U.S.T. 230, http://www.iattc.org/ (entered into force Mar. 3, 1950) [hereinafter IATTC
Convention]. The IATTC and its rules for fishing were updated in the Convention for
Strengthening the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, June 27, 2003, available at
https://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm [https://perma.cc/G4Y9-Z9PZ]
(entered into force on Aug. 27 2010) [hereinafter Antigua Convention]. China, Japan,
the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei are IATTC members. Antigua Convention,
IATTC,
https://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm
[https://perma.cc/PL8R-W5TJ] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (entered into force Mar. 3,
1950).
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International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
(“ICCAT”),21 North Pacific Fisheries Commission (“NPFC”),22
and WCPFC23 because each of these RFMOs includes
participation by the four major Asian fleets that often claim that
privacy concerns prevent them from submitting such
information.
Part II begins by describing the evolution of the rules
relating to fisheries management under international law within
the context of declining fish stocks, including through the four
RMFOs assessed in this Article. Part III reviews the importance of
transparency in fisheries management. Part IV describes the
importance of transparency with respect to vessel registration,
VMS, the provision of catch data, and compliance monitoring. It
then describes how the provisions of the IATTC, ICCAT, NPFC,
and WCPFC with respect to these issues take into account the
need for transparency. Part V concludes that, even if RMFO
members, such as the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei, are
complying with their obligations to submit information and
thereby overcoming whatever privacy issues they may have, the
21. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas art. III, May
14,
1966,
20
U.S.T.
2887,
673
U.N.T.S.
63,
http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Commission/BasicTexts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SU5-L8SD] (entered into force Mar. 21, 1969) [hereinafter
ICCAT]. China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are ICCAT members, and Chinese
Taipei
is
a
cooperating
non-member.
Contracting
Parties,
ICCAT,
https://www.iccat.int/en/contracting.html [https://perma.cc/8SU5-L8SD] (last visited
Feb. 27, 2021).
22. The NPFC North Pacific Fisheries Commission (“NPFC”) was established by
the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources
in the North Pacific Ocean. Convention on the Conservation and Management of High
Seas Fisheries Resources in the North Pacific Ocean, art. 5, Feb. 24, 2012,
https://www.npfc.int/system/files/2017-01/Convention%20Text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZB4T-RE34]. China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Chinese
Taipei are all members. About NPFC, NPFC, https://www.npfc.int/about_npfc
[https://perma.cc/P4MX-GXG4] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (entered into force July 19,
2015).
23. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean (“WCPF Convention”) establishes the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (“WCPFC”). Convention on the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, 2275 U.N.T.S. 40532, https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7P7-YE88] [hereinafter WCPF Convention] (entered into force
June 19, 2004). China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Chinese Taipei are WCPFC
members.
About
WCPFC,
WCPFC,
https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc
[https://perma.cc/XES6-JCWG] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
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RFMOs are not doing enough to ensure that fisheries
information is publicly disclosed. This lack of transparency helps
facilitate IUU fishing and undermines the long-term
sustainability of the fish stocks these RFMOs pledged to conserve
and manage.
II. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT BY RFMOS
As fishers have pulled more fish out of the marine
environment, fish stocks have declined. The Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”)
estimates that the percentage of stocks fished within biologically
sustainable levels has decreased from 90% in 1974 to 65.8% in
2017.24 At the same time, the percentage of overfished stocks—
what the FAO describes as “stocks fished at biologically
unsustainable levels”—has increased from 10% in 1974 to 34.2%
in 2017.25 The FAO estimates that 59.6% of stocks are fully
exploited.26
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”)27 was intended to, among other things, arrest
overfishing.28 In the period following World War II, ever-larger
fishing vessels with ever-larger fishing nets roamed the oceans
unrestrained, depleting stocks in ways that Hugo Grotius could
never have imagined when he declared the oceans and their
bounty “limitless” and thus free for use by all subject to the
“freedom of the seas.”29

24.
25.
26.
27.

FAO 2020, supra note 1, at 47.
Id.
Id.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833
U.N.T.S
3,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CONF.62/122,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_conventi
on.htm [https://perma.cc/F97T-89H5] [hereinafter UNCLOS] (entered into force
Nov. 16, 1994).
NATIONS,
28. See
Oceans
and
the
Law
of
the
Sea,
UNITED
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/oceans-and-law-sea/
[https://perma.cc/YG85-QWKW] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (noting that one
motivation for negotiating UNCLOS was “a growing concern over the toll taken on
coastal fish stocks by long-distance fishing fleets.”).
29. The Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius in 1609 in his book, Mare Liberum, argued that
peaceful navigation and fishing on the high seas was a basic right of nations since natural
law forbade ownership of the commons:

974 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

Among the innovations of UNCLOS was the extension of a
coastal State’s territorial seas from three to twelve nautical miles30
from a coastal State’s coastline within which it would have
sovereignty.31 UNCLOS further allowed a coastal State to establish
exclusive economic zones (“EEZs”) up to 200 nautical miles from
its coastline.32 Within its EEZs, the coastal State would have
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage living
and non-living resources,33 consistent with principles of
maximum sustainable yield34 and optimum utilization.35
In so doing, UNCLOS brought 40% of the marine
environment under the jurisdiction and control of coastal
States.36 Expanded territorial seas and sovereign rights in EEZs
brought the vast majority of fish stocks within the management
authority of coastal States; more than 90% of fish are caught
within EEZs.37 This should have led to improvements in the

The sea is common to all because it is so limitless that it cannot become a
possession of one, and because it was adapted for the use of all, whether we
consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.
HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 28 (1609). For a history of the negotiations of UNCLOS,
see The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), UNITED
NATIONS
(2012),
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspe
ctive.htm [https://perma.cc/B5HX-4R23].
30. UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 3.
31. Id. art. 2.
32. Id. art. 57. UNCLOS defines an exclusive economic zone as the area up to 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured in which coastal States have, among other things, “sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving[,] and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed
and its subsoil.” Id. arts. 55-57.
33. Id. art. 56.
34. Id. art. 61(3).
35. Id. art. 62(1).
36. Sarika Cullis-Suzuki & Daniel Pauly, Failing the High Seas: A Global Evaluation of
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, 34 MARINE POL’Y 1036, 1036 (2010),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2010.03.002 [https://perma.cc/43ND-JS3W].
37. Nandini Ramesh, The Small World of Global Marine Fisheries: The Cross-boundary
1192,
1192
(2019),
Consequences
of
Larval
Dispersal,
364
SCI.
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/364/6446/1192.full
[https://perma.cc/Q27C-HEZB]. Another study found that:
Of the 1,406 taxa analyzed, 585 were caught both within EEZs and high seas,
while 802 were caught only within EEZs and only 19 exclusively in the high
seas. In other words, ~42% of the taxa can be considered “straddling”, while
only ~1.5% are exclusively high seas. The importance of straddling taxa
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conservation status of fish stocks, because coastal States should
have had an interest in the long-term conservation of the stocks.38
For other stocks—“straddling stocks”39 and “highly
migratory fish stocks”40—UNCLOS imposes on coastal States and
States whose nationals fish for those stocks a duty to cooperate
through appropriate RFMOs.41 Virtually all of the high seas are
now covered by at least one RFMO.42 An important role of RFMOs
is to develop CMMs for the sustainable management of straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks, including through catch quotas,
catch allocation, catch document schemes, vessel registration
requirements, information exchange mechanisms, and
monitoring and enforcement rules.43 The four RFMOs assessed

increases greatly when viewed in terms of global catch amount (67%) and
landed value (72%).
U. Rashid Sumaila et al., Winners and Losers in a World Where the High Seas Is Closed to
Fishing, SCI. REP. (Feb. 2015), https://www.nature.com/articles/srep08481
[https://perma.cc/MXC9-EK8K].
38. Annick van Houtte, Legal Aspects of the Management of Shared Fish Stocks: A Review,
in PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE NORWAY-FAO EXPERT CONSULTATION ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SHARED FISH STOCKS - BERGEN, NORWAY, 7-10 OCTOBER 2002,
FIPP/R695 (Suppl.) (2003), http://www.fao.org/3/Y4652E/y4652e04.htm#bm04
[https://perma.cc/36S3-SKAZ] (“The coastal State, whether or not it is interested in the
exploitation of the straddling fish stock on the high seas, has always an interest in the
long term viability of the stock.”).
39. Straddling stocks are those that move between the EEZs of two or more states
or from an EEZ onto the high seas. UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 63.
40. Highly migratory fish stocks are identified in UNCLOS Annex I and include
many tuna species, as well as many sharks and cetaceans, among other species. Id. art. 64.
41. Id. arts. 63, 64. These two articles refer to “appropriate subregional or regional
organizations” for straddling stocks and “appropriate international organizations” for
highly migratory fish stocks. The generic term for these types of bodies is regional
fisheries management organization, or RFMO.
42. Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, supra note 36, at 1036-37. For a pictorial illustration of
the dozens of RFMOs, see MIKE BERGH ET AL., A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND
UNREGULATED
FISHING
IN
AFRICA
153,
fig.
13.1
(2016),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Philippe_Lallemand2/publication/308514276_
A_review_and_assessment_of_the_economic_social_and_environmental_impact_of_ille
gal_unreported_and_unregulated_fishing_in_Africa/links/57fb59ce08ae8da3ce5e7b79
/A-review-and-assessment-of-the-economic-social-and-environmental-impact-of-illegalunreported-and-unregulated-fishing-in-Africa.pdf?origin=publication_detail
[https://perma.cc/4MV7-4MFN].
43. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, Regional Mechanisms, FAO,
http://www.fao.org/iuu-fishing/regional-mechanisms/en/
[https://perma.cc/F8FJ3L2S] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
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in this Article have adopted a range of CMMs44 to help ensure
sustainable fish catches of straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks.
A. IATTC
In 1949, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention
established the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(“IATTC”) to manage tuna and tuna-bait species in the eastern
Pacific Ocean.45 In 2003, IATTC members updated its rules in the
Convention for Strengthening the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Convention, more commonly referred to as the Antigua
Convention.46 The Antigua Convention applies to tuna, tuna-like
species, and other species taken by vessels fishing for those
species47 in the IATTC convention area known informally as the
Eastern Pacific Ocean.48
The IATTC’s twenty-one members and four cooperating
non-members49 (collectively referred to as CPCs) must ensure the
“long-term conservation and sustainable use” of fish stocks

44. The term “conservation and management measures”—CMMs—is both the
generic term for binding rules to manage fish stocks and the specific term used in the
NPFC and WCPFC. The IATTC, however, uses the term “Resolution” and ICCAT uses
“Recommendation” to indicate a binding CMM. This Article uses CMM for consistency
and simplicity.
45. IATTC Convention, supra note 20, art. II(1).
46. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, Introduction.
47. Id. art. I(1).
48. The convention area is defined as:
The area of application of the Convention (“the Convention Area”)
comprises the area of the Pacific Ocean bounded by the coastline of
North, Central, and South America and by the following lines:
i. the 50°N parallel from the coast of North America to its intersection
with the 150°W meridian;
ii. the 150°W meridian to its intersection with the 50°S parallel; and
iii. the 50°S parallel to its intersection with the coast of South America.
Id. art III.
49. IATTC,
http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm
[https://perma.cc/5X4B5HT8] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021). The 21 members are Belize, Canada, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Union, France, Guatemala,
Japan, Kiribati, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Chinese
Taipei, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. four cooperating non-members are
Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Indonesia and Liberia. Id. “Fishing entities” like Chinese
Taipei may become IATTC members. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, arts. XXI,
XXVII.
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covered by the convention in the convention area.50 To achieve
that goal, the IATTC is directed to adopt CMMs to prevent or
eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity51 by setting total
allowable catches, allocating the catch, and determining a level of
fishing effort.52 CPCs must also adopt CMMs “to prevent, deter
and eliminate activities that undermine the effectiveness” of
IATTC CMMs.53 The IATTC has adopted a range of measures to
combat IUU fishing, including CMMs concerning vessel
registration,54 VMS,55 and other things.56 Underpinning the
fulfillment of these goals is the establishment of rules for the
“collection, verification, and timely exchange and reporting of
data” concerning the stocks covered by the Antigua Convention.57
B. ICCAT
The International Convention for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas establishes the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (“ICCAT”)58 to manage tuna and
tuna-like species59 in its convention area, defined as “all waters of

50. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, arts. II, VII(1)(c).
51. Id. art. VII(1)(h).
52. Id. art. VII(1)(l).
53. Id. art. VII(1)(v).
54. IATTC,
Regional
Vessel
Register,
Resolution
C-18-06
(2018),
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-18-06Active_Amends%20and%20replaces%20C-1401%20Regional%20Vessel%20Register.pdf [https://perma.cc/84J6-VGR8].
55. IATTC, Establishment of a Vessel Monitoring System, Resolution C-14-02 (2014),
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-14-02Active_Amends%20and%20replaces%20C-0406%20Vessel%20Monitoring%20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/55YY-9QMF].
56. See generally Active IATTC and AIDCP Resolutions and Recommendations, IATTC,
http://www.iattc.org/ResolutionsActiveENG.htm [https://perma.cc/BJ4F-J5K6] (last
visited Feb. 27, 2021).
57. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. VII(1)(b)(i); IATTC, Data Provision,
Resolution
C-03-05
(2003),
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-03-05Active_Provision%20of%20data.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ4F-J5K6].
58. ICCAT, supra note 21, art. III(1).
59. The convention defines tuna and tuna-like species to mean “(Scombriformes
with the exception of the families Trichiuridae and Gempylidae and the genus Scomber)
and such other species of fishes exploited in tuna fishing.” Id.
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the Atlantic Ocean, including the adjacent Seas.”60 ICCAT now
includes fifty-three members and six cooperating non-members61
(collectively referred to as CPCs) that have agreed to cooperate
to manage covered fish stocks so as to “permit the maximum
sustainable catch for food and other purposes.”62
To fulfill that goal, ICCAT is directed to adopt CMMs
designed to achieve the maximum sustainable catch.63 CPCs also
agree to take action to enforce the convention64 and to provide
“any available statistical, biological and other scientific
information the Commission may need for purposes of this
Convention.”65 Also, the ICCAT convention does not speak
directly to combatting IUU fishing. Nonetheless, ICCAT CMMs
seek to prevent or eliminate IUU fishing in numerous ways,
including by requiring VMS,66 prohibiting landings by vessels not
included in the ICCAT vessel record,67 and establishing an
observer program,68 among many other things.
60. Id. art. I. A visual depiction of the convention area can be found at Convention
Area, ICCAT, https://www.iccat.int/img/misc/ConvArea.jpg [https://perma.cc/5XP5GFFU] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
61. The list of 53 members can be found at Contracting Parties, ICCAT,
https://www.iccat.int/en/contracting.html [https://perma.cc/P8AF-Y8BU] (last visited
Feb. 27, 2021). The six cooperators are Bolivia, Chinese Taipei, Suriname, Guyana, Costa
Rica, and Colombia. Id. Unlike the other RFMOs reviewed in this report, Chinese Taipei
must apply annually to ICCAT to maintain its cooperating status. See ICCAT, Criteria for
Attaining the Status of Cooperating Non-contracting Party, Entity or Fishing Entity in ICCAT,
Recommendation
03-20,
¶
6
(2003),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2003-20-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LPM-3F42] (stating that “Cooperating non-Contracting Parties,
Entities or Fishing Entity status shall be annually reviewed and renewed unless revoked
by the Commission due to non-compliance with ICCAT conservation and management
measures.”).
62. ICCAT Convention, supra note 21, preamble.
63. Id. art. VIII(1).
64. Id. art. IX(1).
65. Id. art. IX(2).
66. See, e.g., ICCAT, Data Exchange Format and Protocol in Relation to the Vessel
Monitoring System (VMS) for the Bluefin Tuna Fishery in the ICCAT Convention Area,
Recommendation
07–08
(2008),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2007-08-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RV2K-Y9W7].
67. ICCAT, The Establishment of an ICCAT Record of Vessels 20 Metres in Length Overall
or Greater Authorized to Operate in the Convention Area, Recommendation 13–13, ¶ 7(a)
(2014),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2013-13-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TQE-YL6X].
68. ICCAT, Minimum Standards for Fishing Vessel Scientific Observer Program,
Recommendation
16–14
(2017),
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C. NPFC
In 2006, negotiations began to create a new RFMO to
“bridge the gap” in the management of deep-sea species and the
marine environment in the north Pacific.69 These negotiations
culminated in the Convention on the Conservation and
Management of the High Seas Fisheries Resources in the North
Pacific Ocean (“NPFC Convention”), which establishes the North
Pacific Fisheries Commission (“NPFC”)70 to manage bottom
fisheries and other fisheries not managed by other RFMOs in the
high seas areas of the North Pacific Ocean.71 The NPFC now
manages squid, chub mackerel, and North Pacific armorhead,
among other species.72 Although the NPFC does not manage tuna
and other fish managed by the WCPFC and IATTC,73 the area it

https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-14-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4K4-CGQ3].
69. About
NPFC,
NPFC,
https://www.npfc.int/about_npfc
[https://perma.cc/G9N4-9A9S] (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
70. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 5. The members of the NPFC are Canada,
China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei, the United
States of America and Vanuatu. The North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC), NPFC,
https://www.npfc.int/ [https://perma.cc/PKB2-YZ2F] (last visited Feb. 9, 2021). It
specifically includes provisions to allow non-States such as Chinese Taipei to participate
as “fishing entities.” NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 5(2).
71. The NPFC Convention defines the Convention area as follows:
This Convention applies to the waters of the high seas area of the North
Pacific Ocean, excluding the high seas areas of the Bering Sea and other
high seas areas that are surrounded by the exclusive economic zone of a
single State. The area of application is bounded to the south by a
continuous line beginning at the seaward limit of waters under the
jurisdiction of the United States of America around the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands at twenty (20) degrees North latitude,
then proceeding East and connecting the following coordinates:
•
20°00’00”N, 180°00’00”E/W;
•
10°00’00”N, 180°00’00”E/W;
•
10°00’00”N, 140°00’00”W;
•
20°00’00”N, 140°00’00”W; and
•
Thence East to the seaward limit of waters under the fisheries
jurisdiction of Mexico.
NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 4(1).
72. Fisheries
Overview,
NPFC,
https://www.npfc.int/fisheries-overview
[https://perma.cc/R3ZF-92G8] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
73. More precisely, the NPFC manages within the convention area “fisheries
resources,” defined to include
all fish, mollusks, crustaceans and other marine species caught by fishing
vessels within the Convention Area, excluding:
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manages overlaps significantly with that of the WCPF Convention
and Antigua Convention.74
The eight NPFC members and one cooperating noncontracting party (collectively referred to as “members and
CNCPs”),75 individually or collectively, must promote optimum
utilization and ensure the long-term sustainability of fisheries
resources in the convention area.76 They must prevent or
eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity,77 as well as
ensure that complete and accurate fisheries data is collected and
shared.78
Consistent with these and other obligations, the NPFC must
adopt CMMs to ensure the long-term sustainability of fisheries
resources in the convention area79 and prevent, deter, and
eliminate IUU fishing.80 Such CMMs include total allowable catch
and total allowable fishing effort,81 and protections for dependent
and associated species.82 To prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU

(i) sedentary species insofar as they are subject to the sovereign rights of coastal
States consistent with Article 77, article 4 of [UNCLOS] and indicator species
of vulnerable marine ecosystems as listed in, or adopted pursuant to [the NPFC
Convention];
(ii) catadromous species;
(iii) marine mammals, marine reptiles and seabirds; and
(iv) other marine species already covered by pre-existing international fisheries
management instruments within the area of competence of such instruments.
Id. art. 1(h).
74. Compare supra note 71 (defining the NPFC Convention Area), with infra note 97
(defining the WCPFC Convention Area), and supra note 48 (defining the IATTC
Convention Area).
75. The NPFC members are Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
the Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei, the United States of America, and Vanuatu.
Panama is the only cooperating non-Contracting Party. About NPFC, NPFC,
https://www.npfc.int/about_npfc [https://perma.cc/T6WX-3AC3] (last visited Jan. 26,
2021).
76. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 3(a).
77. Id. art. 3(f).
78. Id. art. 3(g).
79. Id. art. 7(1)(a).
80. Id. art. 7(2)(d).
81. Id. art. 7(1)(a)-(b).
82. Id. art. 7(1)(c).
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fishing, the NPFC has adopted CMMs relating to vessel
registration,83 VMS,84 and transshipment,85 among others.86
D. WCPFC
Nations created the WCPFC when the annual harvest of tuna
species—yellowfin, bluefin, skipjack, bigeye, and albacore—in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean jumped from approximately
440,000 tonnes to 1.8 million tonnes between 1980 and 2000.87
Despite this large and growing catch of valuable tuna species, the
fishery was not managed under a single institution or agreement.88
After six years of negotiations, negotiators adopted the WCPF
Convention, 89 which establishes the WCPFC.90
83. See NPFC, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE ON INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
VESSEL
REGISTRATION,
CMM
2019-01
(2019),
https://www.npfc.int/cmm-2019-01-information-requirements-vessel-registration
[https://perma.cc/7XJ2-8XX9].
84. See NPFC, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE ON THE VESSEL
MONITORING SYSTEM (VMS), CMM 2019-12 (2019), https://www.npfc.int/cmm-2019-12vessel-monitoring-system-vms [https://perma.cc/9T2J-T4PB].
85. See NPFC, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE ON THE INTERIM
TRANSSHIPMENT PROCEDURES FOR THE NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION, CCM
2016-03 (2017), https://www.npfc.int/cmm-2016-03-interim-transshipment-proceduresnpfc [https://perma.cc/3ZEW-P57R].
86. See generally NPFC, Active CMMs, https://www.npfc.int/active-conservation-andmanagement-measures [https://perma.cc/8P5Z-D2TE] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
87. WCPFC SECRETARIAT, REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE AGREEMENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS 2
(2006),
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/reviewconf/wcpfc_reviewconf
erence.pdf [https://perma.cc/666S-F3XP].
88. Id. at 2 (noting that fishing was conducted under a variety of bilateral and
multilateral negotiated fisheries access arrangements).
89. About
WCPFC,
WCPFC,
http://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc
[https://perma.cc/6434-4WY4] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021). The negotiating states were
Australia, Canada, China, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Fiji
Islands, France, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, the Republic of Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the
Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic
of Korea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga,
Tuvalu, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of
Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and the Oeno Islands, the United States of America, and the
Republic of Vanuatu. WCPFC SECRETARIAT, supra note 87, at 2-3 n.2.
90. To fulfill its conservation and management goals, the WCPF Convention also
establishes subsidiary bodies to provide scientific advice, make recommendations to the
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The WCPF Convention sets an overall goal to “ensure,
through effective management, the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the [W]estern and
[C]entral Pacific Ocean.”91 The WCPFC’s twenty-six members,92
seven participating territories93 and eight cooperating nonmembers (collectively referred to as “CCMs”)94 adopt CMMs95 for
all stocks of highly migratory fish, such as tunas, billfish, and other
species except sauries,96 found in the convention area.97 The
WCPFC, and assist with implementation of the Convention. WCPF Convention, supra note
23, art. 9(2), Annex I.
91. Id. art. 2.
92. The members are Australia, Canada, China, the Cook Islands, the European
Union, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, the
Republic of Korea, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga,
Tuvalu, the United States of America, and Vanuatu. About WCPFC, supra note 89. The
WCPF Convention allows “fishing entities”—non-States such as Chinese Taipei—to
participate in the WCPFC. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 9(2), Annex I.
93. The participating territories are American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Wallis
and Futuna. About WCPFC, supra note 89.
94. The cooperating non-members are Curacao, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Panama, Liberia, Thailand, Vietnam. Id.
95. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(1)(a) (giving the WCPFC authority to
adopt CMMs to ensure the long-term sustainability of such stocks.”).
96. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(3). The Convention defines highly
migratory fish as “all fish stocks of the species listed in Annex 1 of the 1982 Convention
occurring in the Convention Area, and such other species of fish as the Commission may
determine.” Id. art. 1(f).
97. Id. arts. 3(3), 9(1). The convention area covers almost twenty percent of Earth’s
surface.
WCPFC,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
and
Brochures,
https://www.wcpfc.int/frequently-asked-questions-and-brochures
[https://perma.cc/F6CC-X93J] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021). It ranges from Australia and
the East Asian seaboard—excluding the South China Sea—in the west, to east of Hawaii in
the east. The southern boundary of the convention area borders the Southern Ocean at
sixty degrees south latitude and the northern boundary reaches to Alaska and the Bering
Sea. For a map of the convention area, see WCPFC, Convention Area Map,
https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-area-map
[https://perma.cc/H9PL-MBGE]
(last visited Feb. 27, 2021). Specifically, the Convention’s jurisdiction ranges:
From the south coast of Australia due south along the 141 [degree] meridian
of east longitude to its intersection with the 55 [degree] parallel of south
latitude; thence due east along the 55 [degree] parallel of south latitude to its
intersection with the 150 [degree] meridian of east longitude; thence due
south along the 150 [degree] meridian of east longitude to its intersection with
the 60 [degree] parallel of south latitude; thence due east along the 60
[degree] parallel of south latitude to its intersection with the 130 [degree]
meridian of west longitude; thence due north along the 13 [degree] meridian
of west longitude to its intersection with the 4 [degree] parallel of south
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WCPFC has used its authority to adopt a large number of CMMs
relating to catch limits for various stocks,98 bycatch of sea turtles,99
marking of vessels,100 and many other matters.101 Further, although
the WCPF Convention does not expressly refer to IUU fishing, it
directs the WCPFC to adopt “appropriate cooperative mechanisms
for
effective
monitoring,
control,
surveillance
and
enforcement.”102 The WCPFC has responded by adopting CMMs
for vessel registration,103 VMS,104 and an onboard observer
program,105 among other things.106

latitude; thence due west along the 4 [degree] parallel of south latitude to its
intersection with the 150 [degree] meridian of west longitude; thence due
north along the 150 [degree] meridian of west longitude.
WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(1).
98. See, e.g., WCPFC, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE FOR THE NORTH
PACIFIC ALBACORE, CMM 2005–03 (2019), https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-201903/conservation-and-management-measure-north-pacific-albacore
[https://perma.cc/8Q9T-JJVK].
99. See, e.g., WCPFC, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SEA TURTLES, CMM
2008–03
(2008),
https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-03/conservation-andmanagement-sea-turtles [https://perma.cc/Q6F9-4WUD].
100. See, e.g., WCPFC, SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE MARKING AND IDENTIFICATION OF
FISHING VESSELS, CMM 2004–03 (2004), https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-200403/specifications-marking-and-identification-fishing-vessels [https://perma.cc/2NFR9CY6].
101. See,
e.g.,
WCPFC,
Conservation
and
Management
Measures,
http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management-measures
[https://perma.cc/TVX8-Q7HK] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); WCPF Convention, supra
note 23, arts. 9(5), 13(1), 22(5).
102. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(1)(i).
103. See WCPFC, RECORD OF FISHING VESSELS AND AUTHORIZATION TO FISH, CMM
2018-06
(2018),
https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2018-06/conservation-andmanagement-measure-wcpfc-record-fishing-vessels-and-authorisation
[https://perma.cc/TVX8-Q7HK].
104. See WCPFC, COMMISSION VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEM, CMM 2014-02 (2014),
https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2014-02/conservation-and-management-measurecommission-vms [https://perma.cc/BW5T-BZAJ]. For more on the WCPFC’s VMS, see
Vessel Monitoring System, WCPFC https://www.wcpfc.int/vessel-monitoring-system
[https://perma.cc/JS5E-RJQ6] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
105. See WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 28(1). This program involves the use
of impartial observers and ensures that the WCPFC receives sufficient data on catch levels.
Id. art. 28. For more on the WCPFC’s observer program, see Regional Observer Programme,
WCPFC,
https://www.wcpfc.int/regional-observer-programme
[https://perma.cc/T5HV-RJ9W] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
106. See
generally
Conservation
and
Management
Measures,
WCPFC,
https://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management-measures
[https://perma.cc/LXE4-UME8] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT
Neither the extension of coastal State sovereign rights nor
regional management through RFMOs has led to improvements
in the conservation status of fish stocks. As noted above, FAO has
reported a continuing decline in the conservation status of stocks
globally.107 Another study concluded that two-thirds of all stocks
managed by RFMOs are depleted or being overfished.108 Greed,109
corruption,110 subsidies,111 and IUU fishing112 all conspire to
undermine the development, implementation, and enforcement
of sustainable catch quotas.
Because of these challenges, transparent decision-making
processes are critical for achieving sustainable fisheries113 and
sustainable development more broadly.114 Yet, the oceans
themselves are notoriously nontransparent.115 Light rapidly
107. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
108. Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, supra note 36, at 1041.
109. Donald Ludwig et al., Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and Conservation:
Lessons from History, 260 SCI. 17, 36 (1993) (“The shortsightedness and greed of humans
underlie
difficulties
in
management
of
resources.”),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/260/5104/17
[https://perma.cc/BC2T9JGU].
110. Camilo Mora et al., Management Effectiveness of the World’s Marine Fisheries, 7
PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 3 (2009).
111. Id. at 7 (“We found that the probability of fisheries sustainability in
nontransparent EEZs was reduced from 78% to 67% due to the effects of even modest
subsidies.”).
112. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
113. Mora et al., supra note 110, at 1 (“[T]he conversion of scientific advice into
policy, through a participatory and transparent process, is at the core of achieving
fisheries sustainability, regardless of other attributes of the fisheries.”); Robert Costanza
et al., Rules for Sustainable Governance of the Oceans, 281 SCI. 198, 199 (1998),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/281/5374/198.full.pdf?casa_token=APW
6eNJW0TgAAAAA:Wo7cDfvkhO3kIpsp09AvZYPoJUDRA5QOe4aeoTIoODoqNtslYhaAY
uGEKIrpR8cPrnowfOyzlWA7 [https://perma.cc/V9L7-LEUX] (“The sustainable
governance of the oceans will require an ongoing, participatory, and open process
involving all the major stakeholder groups.”).
114. G.A. Res. 66/288, The Future We Want ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288 (Sept.
11,
2012),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/476/10/PDF/N1147610.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/PJC3-EXM3] (“[T]o achieve our sustainable development goals, we
need institutions at all levels that are effective, transparent, accountable and
democratic.”).
115. Cornelius Hammer, Observer and Observer Data — What for? — A View from an
ICES Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES OBSERVER AND
MONITORING CONFERENCE 8, 8 (Steve Kennelly & Lisa Borges eds., 2018) (Oceans are
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dissipates beyond a depth of 200 meters,116 hiding the valuable
tuna, swordfish, and other marine fish stocks sought by a global
fleet of 4.6 million vessels.117 The oceans also hide a multitude of
sins, including IUU fishing, human rights violations, wildlife
smuggling, and drug and gun smuggling.118 At the United
Nations Security Council, transnational crime on the oceans has
been linked to conflicts in Africa, millions of dollars of lost
revenue, the spread of weapons, and drug and human
trafficking.119
For these reasons, fisheries must become more transparent
throughout the entire lifecycle of the fishing industry, including
transshipment,120 subsidies,121 the provision of operational data,122
traceability schemes, prosecution of fisheries crimes,123 and much
more.124 In fact, the FAO has stated that the

“enormously wide, deep and nontransparent.”), https://ifomcvigo.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/proceedings-9th-ifomc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KA3KYCXD].
116. See The Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., How Far Does Light Travel in the
Ocean?, NAT'L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lighttravel.html
[https://perma.cc/M227-V2TM] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020).
117. FAO, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE: MEETING THE
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS
5
(2018),
http://www.fao.org/3/i9540en/i9540en.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3NR-HWV9].
118. See generally U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED
CRIME IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY: FOCUS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, SMUGGLING OF
MIGRANTS,
ILLICIT
DRUGS
TRAFFICKING
(2011),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/IssuePaperTOCintheFishingIndustry.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FVU-REHS].
119. Press Release, Security Council, High Seas Crime Becoming More
Sophisticated, Endangering Lives, International Security, Speakers Tell Security Council,
U.N.
Press
Release
SC/13691
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13691.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/8GL9FHVW].
120. See Wold & Cook, supra note 19.
121. See ARTHUR E. APPLETON, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., OPTIONS
IMPROVING THE TRANSPARENCY OF FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
(2017),
FOR
https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/Opt
ions%20for%20Improving%20the%20Transparency%20of%20Fisheries%20Subsidies.p
df [https://perma.cc/NS9H-JMYB].
122. Wold et al., supra note 17.
123. See Chasing Red Herrings, supra note 7, at 24.
124. See, e.g., We Challenge EU’s Lack of Transparency around Fishing Quotas,
CLIENTEARTH (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.clientearth.org/we-challenge-eus-lack-oftransparency-around-fishing-quotas/ [https://perma.cc/2XB3-U8E3]. See generally
Improving Transparency in Fisheries, ENVTL. JUST. FOUND., https://ejfoundation.org/what-
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lack of basic transparency could be seen as an underlying
facilitator of all the negative aspects of the global fisheries
sector—IUU fishing, fleet overcapacity, overfishing, illdirected subsidies, corruption, poor fisheries management
decisions, etc. A more transparent sector would place a
spotlight on such activities whenever they occur, making it
harder for perpetrators to hide behind the current veil of
secrecy and requiring immediate action to be taken to
correct the wrong.125

International agreements and declarations have also called
for more transparent decision-making. The United Nations Fish
Stocks Agreement specifically calls for States participating in
RFMOs to establish transparent and participatory processes.126
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Human
Development provides that “States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making information widely
available.”127 In 2019, the United Nations General Assembly
called on States acting individually and through RFMOs “to
improve transparency on fishing capacity, including by
identifying, sharing and publicizing relevant information in this
regard, subject to confidentiality requirements.”128 It also urged
we-do/oceans/transparency [https://perma.cc/UV3V-JRXV] (last visited Feb. 13,
2021).
125. FAO, STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2010 105 (2010),
https://epdf.pub/state-of-world-fisheries-and-aquaculture-2010.html
[https://perma.cc/KZC9-4FP6].
126. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 12, Aug.
4, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agreement/
CONF164_37.htm
[https://perma.cc/U22K-QTJ8]
[hereinafter
Fish
Stocks
Agreement].
127. U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/ (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992),
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3ACK8F3].
128. G.A. Res. 74/18, Sustainable Fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments ¶ 126,
U.N.
Doc.
A/RES/74/18
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/74/18
[https://perma.cc/7828-TTHZ]
[hereinafter Sustainable Fisheries]. Earlier, in 2012, the General Assembly “recognize[d]
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RFMOs “to improve transparency and to ensure that their
decision-making processes are fair and transparent and facilitate
the adoption of conservation and management measures in a
timely and effective manner.”129 It further “recognize[d] the
importance of ensuring transparency of reporting of fishing
activities within [RFMOs] in order to facilitate efforts to combat
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as well as the
importance of respecting the reporting obligations within those
organizations.”130
Transparency helps lead to sustainable outcomes in several
ways. Transparency helps ensure that the chosen CMMs are
credible;131 consequently, fishers are more likely to follow the
rules.132 Another study concluded that “the conversion of
scientific advice into policy, through a participatory and
transparent process, is at the core of achieving fisheries
sustainability, regardless of other attributes of the fisheries,”133

the need for transparency and accountability in fisheries management by regional
fisheries management organizations.” The Future We Want, supra note 114, ¶ 172.
129. The Future We Want, supra note 114, ¶ 171. The full paragraph reads as
follows:
Urges regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements to
improve transparency and to ensure that their decision-making processes are
fair and transparent and facilitate the adoption of conservation and
management measures in a timely and effective manner, including considering
provisions for effective voting and objection procedures, where appropriate, to
rely on the best scientific information available, incorporate the precautionary
approach and ecosystem approaches, and address participatory rights,
including through, inter alia, the development of transparent criteria for
allocating fishing opportunities which reflects, where appropriate, the relevant
provisions of the Agreement, taking due account, inter alia, of the status of the
relevant stocks and the respective interests in the fishery . . . .
130. Id. ¶ 180.
131. See Ruth A. Davis & Quentin Hanich, Transparency in Fisheries Conservation and
POL’Y
1,
2
(2020),
Management
Measures,
MARINE
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104088
[https://perma.cc/2N6F-VK46]
(“[T]ransparency can be important for maintaining the ongoing legitimacy of RFMO
management and the approval of their activities by stakeholders and the broader
community.”).
132. See Costanza et al., supra note 113, at 199. See also Juan A. Castilla & Omar
Defeo, Paradigm Shifts Needed in World Fisheries, 309 SCI. 1324 (2005), https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/476/10/PDF/N1147610.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/K2L3-XWJ3] (“In our view, legitimizing the participation of fishers
in the planning and surveillance of management measures is a promising short-term
solution to current artisanal fishery crises, promoting compliance with regulations.”).
133. Mora et al., supra note 110, at 2.
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largely by promoting compliance.134 Transparency can also
improve equity “by mitigating power imbalances and enabling a
more equitable distribution of conservation benefits and
burdens.”135
IV. TRANSPARENCY IN RFMOS
The conventions establishing the IATTC,136 NPFC,137 and
WCPFC138 all specifically call for transparency in the decisionmaking processes of the RFMOs, and several ICCAT CMMs also
call for transparency.139 These RFMOs have, to a certain extent,
adopted CMMs that call for the submission of information in a
transparent way in order to combat IUU fishing.140 They have
established rules relating to vessel registration, the use of VMS,
134. Id. at 7.
135. Davis & Hanich, supra note 131, at 2.
136. Antigua Convention provides that:
“The Commission shall promote transparency in the implementation of this
Convention in its decision-making processes and other activities, inter alia, through:
(a) the public dissemination of pertinent non-confidential information;
and
(b) as appropriate, facilitating consultations with, and the effective
participation of, non-governmental organizations, representatives of the
fishing industry, particularly the fishing fleet, and other interested bodies
and individuals.”
Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVI(1).
137. See NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 3(l) (calling for NPFC members to
“apply[] this Convention in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner,
consistent with international law.”).
138. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 21 (“The Commission shall promote
transparency in its decision-making processes and other activities.”).
139. See, e.g., ICCAT, General Outline of Integrated Monitoring Measures Adopted by
ICCAT, Doc. 02–31 (2002), https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdfe/2002-31-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4TX-3BYR] (“Effective monitoring measures
should embody a number of principles, namely: . . . The general obligation to cooperate
and a commitment to implement the following measures with transparency, taking into
account requirements for confidentiality.”); ICCAT, Establishing a Multi-Annual
Management Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea,
Recommendation
18–02,
¶
117
(2020),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2018-02-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55JK-STND] (“In order to have greater transparency in
implementing this Recommendation, the Secretariat shall elaborate bi-yearly a report on
the implementation of this Recommendation.”).
140. Of course, these RFMOs can only be as transparent as the contracting
governments allow them to be. RFMOs cannot be transparent if the contracting
governments do not submit information necessary to ensure sustainable fisheries and
compliance with CMMs.
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the submission of vessel-specific catch data, and compliance
monitoring—information that is published to the relevant
secretariat’s website or otherwise submitted in annual reports and
reviewed for compliance purposes. Yet, in each case, the RFMOs
fall short of being fully transparent or fail to require submission
of information needed to be fully transparent in order to prevent
and deter IUU fishing and improve the long-term conservation of
fish stocks.
A. Vessel Registration
1. The Need
The need for transparency begins at the initial stage of
authorization of vessels to engage in fishing activities: vessel
registration. As FAO notes, “[f]ishing vessel registration and the
maintenance of a comprehensive record of fishing vessels are
fundamental pillars for effective fisheries management and
enforcement at the national level and essential for collaborative
effort at the regional and global levels.”141
The list of vessels registered and authorized to fish in the
relevant convention area is of obvious importance. With
registration, RFMO members can determine which vessels are
permitted to fish for covered stocks in the relevant convention
area. If a vessel is not registered, then RFMO members can
prioritize the boarding and inspection of those vessels.
However, more than vessel registration is needed to ensure
effective enforcement and compliance with CMMs. Rules must
require the identification of those individuals who actually enjoy
the benefits of ownership—known as the beneficial owners—even
though legal title to a vessel is in another name, because too
frequently the beneficial owners hide behind a corporate veil by
establishing shell corporations.142 In a comprehensive analysis of
141. FAO, STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2010 104 (2010),
https://dl.epdf.pub/download/state-of-world-fisheries-and-aquaculture2010.html?hash=6a82bc00db80c642ad95570c905ff078&captcha=cc385d64b7d2cdfe86e
e9dd0fb3eb01b [https://perma.cc/K2WL-CQ3U].
142. A technical or legal definition of “beneficial owner” does not exist. The North
Atlantic Fisheries Intelligence Group and INTERPOL describe the beneficial owner as
the “key persons ultimately controlling a business entity—the ‘beneficial owners’ of the
entity—or persons who are otherwise involved in the operation of a business venture.
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the impact of flags of convenience on fisheries crime law
enforcement, the North Atlantic Fisheries Intelligence Group
and INTERPOL reported the following:
Without knowing the identity of persons involved in a
criminal activity, investigators may be unable to determine
whether they have jurisdiction to investigate a case and
whether they should share information with other relevant
authorities. They may also be prevented from turning
intelligence into evidence through mutual legal assistance
requests.143

They also identified a number of reasons for needing the
identity of the persons engaged in and controlling commercial
activities. From a law enforcement perspective, knowing the
identity of the beneficial owners and operators of vessels is, in
most cases, critical to identifying, investigating, and prosecuting
fisheries crime and tax evasion.144 In other words, without the
names of the beneficial owners, IUU fishing is likely to persist,
thereby undermining the long-term conservation of fish stocks.
2. The RFMO Rules
All four of the RFMOs included in this Article require
registration of vessels. Indeed, they all require members and

Importantly, in this context a ‘person’ refers to a natural person—a living, breathing
human being—and not a ‘legal’ person, such as a company, partnership or a trust.”
Chasing Red Herrings, supra note 7, at 24. The FAO, in its International Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)
also distinguished between legal person in whose name the vessel is registered and the
nationality of the natural or legal person with beneficial ownership of the vessel. See FAO,
INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL,
UNREPORTED
AND
UNREGULATED
FISHING
¶
42
(2001),
http://www.fao.org/3/y1224e/Y1224E.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XD8-VWAU].
143. Chasing Red Herrings, supra note 7, at 4.
144. Id. at 31. The authors of this report acknowledged that the flagging of foreignowned vessels is not, in and of itself, a law enforcement problem. Instead:
it is the extent to which a flag state facilitates secrecy in beneficial vessel
ownership. Secrecy is facilitated by open registers when they allow the
registered owner of vessels on their ship register to be a local company owned
by a foreign corporate vehicle without traceable beneficial ownership. These
open registries become secrecy jurisdictions in their own right and provide ship
owners with an added layer of secrecy over and beyond the protection already
afforded them through the jurisdiction(s) where the corporate structure is
situated.
Id. at 28.
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cooperating non-members (collectively referred to now as
“members” for simplicity145) to submit a great deal of information
concerning the vessel and vessel ownership. However, they do not
specifically require submission of beneficial ownership.
The IATTC,146 ICCAT,147 NPFC,148 and WCPFC149 all require
each member to maintain a record of vessels entitled to fly its flag
and authorized to fish in the convention area for fish stocks
covered by the relevant convention. Moreover, each of these four
RFMOs defines “fishing vessel” broadly to include any vessel,
including a vessel involved in the transshipment of fish from the
vessel actually catching the fish to a larger, refrigerated carrier

145. Recall from Part II that these RFMOs refer to members and cooperating nonmembers differently. See supra Part II. The IATTC and ICCAT use “CPCs,” the WCPFC
uses “CCMs” and the NPFC uses “members and CNCPs.” See supra Part II.
146. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, Annex I; IATTC Resolution C-18-06, supra
note 54.
147. See ICCAT, Multi-annual Conservation and Management Programme for Tropical
Tunas
¶
31,
Recommendation
16-01,
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-01-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRT9-M8G3]. See also ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT Amending
Three Recommendations in Conformity with the 2009 Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the
Establishment of an ICCAT Record of Vessels 20 meters in Length Overall or Greater Authorized
to
Operate
in
the
Convention
Area,
Recommendation
09-09
(2010),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2009-09-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YD6W-DDR9] (decreasing the size of vessels to which the Vessel
Record applies from 24 meters to 20 meters in length overall).
148. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 13(8); NPFC CMM 2019–01, supra note
83, ¶¶ 1-3.
149. WCPFC Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(4); ICCAT Recommendation 1313, supra note 67, ¶ 1; WCPFC CMM 2018–06, supra note 103, ¶ 6; WCPF Convention,
supra note 23, art. 24(5) & Annex IV. Each member is also required to notify the WCPFC
of any additions and deletions to the list. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(6);
WCPFC CMM 2018–06, supra note 103, ¶ 7. See also WCPFC CMM 2004–03, supra note
100, §§ 2.1.1, 3.1.
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vessel.150 For certainty, perhaps, the IATTC adopted a separate
resolution specifically for registration of carrier vessels.151
The Antigua Convention typifies the information that
members must include in the vessel registry for each vessel. For
each vessel, members must ensure that the following information
is included in that record:
a.

name of vessel, registration number, previous names (if
known), and port of registry

b.

a photograph of the vessel showing its registration
number;

c.

previous flag (if known and if any);

d.

International Radio Call Sign (if any);

e.

name and address of owner or owners;

f.

where and when built;

g.

length, beam, and moulded depth;

h.

freezer type and freezer capacity, in cubic meters;

i.

number and capacity of fish holds, in cubic meters and,
in the case of purse-seine vessels, capacity breakdown by
fish hold if possible;

j.

name and address of operator(s) and/or manager(s) (if
any);

k.

type of vessel;

l.

type of fishing method or methods;

m. gross tonnage;
150. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(e) (defining “fishing vessel” as “any
vessel used or intended for use for the purpose of fishing, including support ships, carrier
vessels and any other vessel directly involved in such operations.”). The NPFC
Convention is identical. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 1(n). The definition in
the Antigua Convention is also identical except that the definition defines “vessel” rather
than “fishing vessel.” Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. I(1)(3). ICCAT operates
slightly differently with a binding recommendation adopted specifically to create a vessel
registry requirement for carrier vessels. ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT on
Transhipment,
Recommendation
16-15,
¶
7
(2017),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-15-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3XC-AE6W].
151. IATTC, Establishing a Program for Transshipments by Large-scale Fishing Vessels,
Resolution
C-12-07,
¶
6,
7
(2012),
https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-12-07Active_Amends%20and%20replaces%20C-11-09%20Transhipments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76R6-YLGY].
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n.

power of main engine or engines;

o.

the nature of the authorization to fish granted by the flag
CPC (such as main target species); and

p.

International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) or
Lloyd’s Register (“LR”) number, if issued.152
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Members must “verify the existence and operational status
of, and confirm the accuracy of the information on, its vessels.”153
Perhaps one reason for the emphasis on vessel registration, and
the inclusion of vessel registration requirements in multiple
resolutions, is because the members consider any fishing by
vessels not included in the Record to be “undermining IATTC
management measures.”154 The NPFC considers the vessel

152. IATTC Resolution C-18-06, supra note 54, ¶ 2; Antigua Convention, supra note
20, Annex 1, ¶ 1. CPCs must also notify the IATTC Secretariat of any additions or
modifications to the record. Id. Annex 1, ¶ 2, 3. See also NPFC CMM 2019–01, supra note
83, Annex (enumerating similar but slightly more comprehensive information
requirements for vessel registration in the NPFC); WCPFC CMM 2018–06, supra note
103, ¶ 6; WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(5) & Annex IV. Each member is also
required to notify the WCPFC of any additions and deletions to the list. WCPF
Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(6); WCPFC, CMM 2018–06, supra note 103, ¶ 7. See
also WCPFC CMM 2004–03, supra note 100, §§ 2.1.1, 3.1 (enumerating the information
requirements for the WPPFC). ICCAT has adopted its vessel registration in a more
piecemeal fashion. See ICCAT Recommendation 13-13, supra note 67, ¶ 2; ICCAT
Recommendation 16-15, supra note 150, ¶ 8. It also has several recommendations for
vessel registration for those vessels in species-specific fisheries. See, e.g., ICCAT, Replacing
the Recommendation [13-04] and Establishing a Multi-annual Recovery Plan for Mediterranean
Swordfish,
Recommendation
16-05,
¶¶
21,
27
(2017),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-05-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MC6-RMT2]; ICCAT, Amending the Recommendation for the
Conservation of South Atlantic Swordfish, Recommendation 17-03, ¶ 8 (2018),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2017-03-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT6G-RXJ8]; ICCAT, Southern Albacore Catch Limits for the Period
2017–2020,
Recommendation
16-07,
¶
10
(2016),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-07-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE3Z-JAR6]; ICCAT, Multi-annual Conservation and Management
Programme for North Atlantic Albacore, Recommendation 16-06, ¶ 10 (2017),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-06-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CAD7-V4PK].
153. IATTC Resolution C-02-03, Capacity of the Tuna Fleet Operating in the Eastern
Pacific
Ocean
(Revised),
at
¶
5
(2002),
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-02-03Active_Capacity%20of%20the%20tuna%20fleet%20operating%20in%20the%20EPO.pd
f [https://perma.cc/6QNH-CHDA].
154. Id.
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registry of authorized fishing vessels the “central pillar” of its
compliance program.155
The members directed the relevant secretariat to maintain a
vessel registry based on information provided by members.156
Members must notify the relevant secretariat of any modifications
to the vessel registry,157 and the secretariats must maintain and
publicize the list, including by placing the vessel registry on the
relevant convention’s website.158 The NPFC must also maintain a
publicly accessible vessel registry, “taking due account of the need
to protect the confidentiality of personal information, consistent
with the domestic practice” of each member and CNPC.159
However, the NPFC does not explain what confidentiality issues
may arise from the publication of the vessel registry. Similarly, the
WCPFC’s Record of Fishing Vessels is publicly available160 with the

155. Compliance, Terms of Reference, NPFC, https://www.npfc.int/compliance
[https://perma.cc/6H85-GQMZ] (Feb. 27, 2021).
156. IATTC Resolution C-18-06, supra note 54, ¶ 1; Antigua Convention, supra note
20, art. XII(2)(k); WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(7).
157. ICCAT Recommendation 13-13, supra note 67, at ¶ 3; ICCAT
Recommendation 16-01, supra note 147, ¶ 29; ICCAT Recommendation 16-15, supra
note 150, ¶ 9; NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 13(9); NPFC CMM 2019–01, supra
note 83, ¶¶ 2, 3; WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(6); WCPFC CMM 2018–06,
supra note 103, ¶ 7.
158. ICCAT Recommendation 13-13, supra note 67, ¶ 4; ICCAT Recommendation
16-01, supra note 147, ¶ 31; ICCAT Recommendation 16-15, supra note 150, ¶ 10. The
ICCAT Record of Vessels can be found at ICCAT, Record of Vessels,
https://www.iccat.int/en/VesselsRecord.asp [https://perma.cc/RK7Q-RGFX] (last
visited Feb. 27, 2021). The IATTC secretariat must make the transshipment vessel record
public, including through its website. IATTC Resolution C-12-07, supra note 151, ¶ 9.
The more general resolution applicable to all vessels, however, does not explicitly direct
the Secretariat to make the Record public. See generally IATTC Resolution C-18-06, supra
note 54. Nonetheless, the Secretariat has done so. Vessel Database, IATTC,
https://www.iattc.org/VesselRegister/VesselList.aspx?List=RegVessels&Lang=ENG
[https://perma.cc/YC2D-49AR] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
159. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 13(10). The NPFC record of fishing
vessels can be found at Member/CNCP Flagged Vessels Register, NPFC,
https://www.npfc.int/compliance/vessels
[https://perma.cc/7W5W-HLCL]
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2021).
160. WCPFC, STANDARDS, SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE WESTERN AND
CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHRIES COMMISSION RECORD OF FISHING VESSELS, CMM 2014-03 ¶¶
1(b), 9 (2014), https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2014-03/standards-specifications-andprocedures-western-and-central-pacific-fisheries
[https://perma.cc/T2XW-4J8X];
WCPFC CMM 2018-06, supra note 103, ¶ 14. The Record of Fishing Vessels can be found
on the WCPFC’s website at https://www.wcpfc.int/vessels [https://perma.cc/9V7R5UMY].
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exception of information considered to be non-public domain
data.161
B. Vessel Monitoring Systems
1. The Need
Vessel Monitoring Systems (“VMS”) track the location of
vessels and, consequently, they are a crucial component of
monitoring, control, and surveillance programs of RFMOs and
national fisheries agencies in the fight against IUU fishing.162
With VMS, on-board transceiver units known as automatic
location communicators transmit vessel position, the vessel
identifier, time, and date, at fixed or variable intervals, to
satellites; vessels transmit that information to land-based fisheries
monitoring centers.163
Given pervasive IUU fishing, greater and more transparent
use of VMS data is needed. Global Fishing Watch, a
nongovernmental organization that uses various technologies to
track vessels,164 succinctly states:
Where countries publicly share their vessel data we can create
a more complete and connected picture of global fishing
activity. Law-abiding fishers are tracked easily and openly,
demonstrating their compliance. Rogue operators stand out
due to their patchy track record or suspicious behavior.
Compliant fishers can be rewarded through faster, more
efficient port entry and landings. Unauthorized vessels, and

161. WCPFC CMM 2014-03, supra note 160, ¶ 9; WCPFC CMM 2018-06, supra note
103, ¶ 36 (“For each [carrier and bunker] vessel, the Register will include all the
information listed in paragraph 6, a copy of the written undertaking provided under
paragraph 31, and the CCM(s) that requested inclusion of the vessel on the Register.”)
(emphasis added).
162. See generally FAO, FISHING OPERATIONS: VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEMS 1-5
(FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 1, Suppl. 1, 1998),
http://www.fao.org/3/a-w9633e.pdf; see HOLLY KOEHLER, RFMO VESSEL MONITORING
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY BEST PRACTICES 7 (ISSF Technical
Report
2020-08,
2020),
https://iss-foundation.org/downloads/19967/
[https://perma.cc/WQ2J-FBL5].
163. KOEHLER, supra note 162, at 7; see also Enforcement, Vessel Monitoring, NOAA
FISHERIES,
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/enforcement#vessel-monitoring
[https://perma.cc/RB4Z-4MK9] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
164. See About, GLOB. FISHING WATCH, https://globalfishingwatch.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/H7WH-3DW7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).

996 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

those with a history of non-compliance, can be prioritized for
inspection or denied port entry.165

Not only is VMS cost effective—costing as little as US$ 1,000166—
but it also puts the burden on the fishing vessel to demonstrate
compliance rather than on governments to prove noncompliance.167 With continuous tracking, VMS can identify vessels
legally fishing at all times and thus help ensure that vessels are
fishing when and where they are authorized to fish.
2. The RFMO Rules
RFMOs recognize the critical importance of VMS. The
NPFC, for example, has recognized VMS as a critical part of its
efforts “to ensure compliance with, and enforcement of the
provisions of the Convention and CMMs.”168 The WCPFC has
noted the importance of VMS “as a tool to effectively support the
principles and measures for the conservation and management
of highly migratory species within the Convention Area.”169
The VMS regimes of these four RFMOs are essentially the
same. Members must ensure that the vessels they flag operate
VMS while fishing in the relevant convention area.170 The vessels
must transmit, as in the case of the IATTC, the vessel’s
identification, speed and course, and geographical position
(latitude and longitude) with an error of less than 100 meters at
165. Ocean Sustainability through Transparency, Data-sharing and Collaboration, GLOB.
FISHING
WATCH,
https://globalfishingwatch.org/vms-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/VCS5-PLJD] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
166. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TRACKING FISHING VESSELS AROUND THE GLOBE 10
(Apr.
2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/04/illegal_fishing_tracking_fishing_vessels_around_the_globe.pd
f [https://perma.cc/3RWV-DSEM].
167. Ocean Sustainability through Transparency, Data-sharing and Collaboration, supra
note 165.
168. NPFC CMM 2019-12, supra note 84, ¶ 2.
169. WCPFC CMM 2014-02, supra note 104, at 1.
170. IATTC Resolution C-14-02, supra note 55, ¶ 1; ICCAT, Minimum Standards for
Vessel Monitoring Systems in the ICCAT Convention Area, Recommendation 18-10, ¶ 1
(2019),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2018-10-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5X9-RELW]; NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 13(4) (The
NPFC Convention further directs the NPFC to develop standards for VMS. NPFC
Convention, supra note 22, art. 7(2)(e)); WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 24(8)(9); WCPFC CMM 2014-02, supra note 104, ¶ 6 (More information about the
management of VMS by the WCPFC can be found at https://www.wcpfc.int/vesselmonitoring-system [https://perma.cc/TV57-A464]).
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a confidence level of 98%; and the date and time of fixing the
vessel’s position.171 The provisions of ICCAT,172 the NPFC,173 and
the WCPFC174 are similar. In addition, the information must be
transmitted “automatically and independently of any
intervention.”175
They differ with respect to how frequently vessels must
transmit VMS data. For example, the IATTC requires longliners
to transmit VMS data every four hours and purse seiners and
other vessels every two hours.176 ICCAT requires purse seiners to
transmit VMS data every hour and all other vessels at least two
hours,177 while the NPFC178 and WCPFC require transmission
every hour.179
More critically for transparency purposes, these RFMOs
differ as to whom vessels must transmit VMS data. The WCPFC
requires vessels to transmit all VMS data directly to the WCPFC
Secretariat.180 This is the preferred mechanism as it bypasses the
171. IATTC Resolution C-14-02, supra note 55, ¶ 2.
172. The VMS must collect and transit the vessel’s identification and geographical
position (longitude, latitude) with a margin of error lower than 500 meters, with a
confidence interval of 99%, as well as the date and time. ICCAT Recommendation 18-10,
supra note 170, ¶ 1(a)-(b). The format for communicating VMS data by fishing vessels is
also provided. ICCAT, Recommendation 07-08, supra note 66, Annex 2. These VMS rules
also apply to charter vessels. ICCAT, Vessel Chartering, Recommendation 13-14, ¶ 7
(2014),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2013-14-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NX9T-2W77]. They also apply to carrier vessels. ICCAT
Recommendation 16-15, supra note 150, ¶ 11.
173. The vessel’s VMS must transmit:
(i) the vessel’s unique identifier for the mobile transmitting unit;
(ii) the vessel’s current geographical position (latitude and longitude)
accurate to within 100m; and,
(iii) the date and time (expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)) of
the fixing of the vessel’s position.
NPFC CMM 2019-12, supra note 84, ¶ 1(k).
174. VMS must transmit the static unique identifier of the vessel’s automatic
location communicator, the vessel’s current geographical position (latitude and
longitude), and the date and time of the fixing of the vessel’s geographic position.
WCPFC CMM 2014-02, supra note 104, ¶ 7(a), Annex, ¶ 1.
175. Id.; NPFC CMM 2019-12, supra note 84, Annex, ¶ 1 (using the identical
language); ICCAT, Recommendation 18-10, supra note 170, ¶ 1(a) (“continuously,
automatically, and independent of any intervention by the vessel.”); IATTC, Resolution
C-14-02, supra note 55, ¶ 2(c) (data transmission must be “fully automatic”).
176. IATTC Resolution C-14-02, supra note 55, ¶ 2(b).
177. ICCAT Recommendation 18-10, supra note 170, ¶ 3.
178. NPFC CMM 2019-12, supra note 84, ¶ 8.
179. WCPFC CMM 2014-02, supra note 104, Annex 1, ¶ 3.
180. See id. ¶ 7(a).
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flag State and any possibility of interference in the submission of
data.
ICCAT and the NPFC adopt hybrid models, of sorts. In the
NPFC, the members must automatically transmit VMS data to the
NPFC Secretariat181 or they may allow the vessel to send the VMS
data directly to the Secretariat.182 In ICCAT, vessels transmit VMS
data to the relevant flag State member. 183 Other
recommendations of ICCAT impose stricter VMS requirements.
With respect to bluefin tuna, members must require fishing
vessels with a length equal to or greater than 15 meters to operate
VMS.184 This information is transmitted to the ICCAT Secretariat
as well as the flag State.185 The ICCAT Secretariat must make VMS
data available to members with an active presence in the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean and must notify members of any
delay or non-receipt of such data.186 Members must ensure that
VMS data received from its fishing vessels “are recorded in
computer readable form for a period of three years.”187 Members
must also verify VMS data submitted by covered bluefin tuna
fishing vessels.188
In the IATTC, vessels transmit VMS data to the flag State’s
fisheries monitoring center (“FMC”).189 The relevant VMS CMMs
do not specifically require members to report their VMS data to
the IATTC or the Secretariat. The Antigua Convention does
require members to provide the IATTC with “all the information
that may be required for the fulfilment of the objective of the
Convention, including statistical and biological information
concerning its fishing activities in the Convention Area.”190
However, CPCs have not interpreted this provision to require
submission of VMS data.191 The VMS used by applicable vessels
should, “if practicable,” transmit to the IATTC Secretariat.192
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

NPFC CMM 2019-12, supra note 84, ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 10.
ICCAT Recommendation 18-10, supra note 170, ¶ 1.
ICCAT Recommendation 18-02, supra note 139, ¶ 105.
ICCAT Recommendation 07-08, supra note 66, ¶ 3 & Annex 1, ¶ 3.
ICCAT Recommendation 18-02, supra note 139, ¶ 105.
ICCAT Recommendation 07-08, supra note 66, Annex 1, ¶ 2.
ICCAT Recommendation 18-02, supra note 139, ¶ 76.
IATTC Resolution C-14-02, supra note 55, ¶ 2(b).
Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVIII(2).
Personal Interview with Brad Wiley, IATTC Policy Officer (Aug. 26, 2020).
IATTC Resolution C-14-02, supra note 55, ¶ 4.
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Finally, the VMS provisions of these four RFMOs are alike
with respect to confidentiality. In the IATTC, any VMS data
submitted to the Secretariat must be “maintained in strict
accordance with the Commission’s rules and procedures on
confidentiality.”193 ICCAT Recommendation 18-10 makes clear
that VMS data, and whether such data is confidential or publicly
available, is a matter of domestic law.194 Nonetheless, members
“are encouraged” to share VMS data.195 The NPFC considers VMS
data received by the Secretariat to be confidential information,
which may be used and shared only in accordance with the
NPFC’s Data-Sharing and Data-Security Protocols for Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS) Data.196 The WCPFC considers fine resolution VMS
data to be confidential,197 but VMS data can be released for
scientific purposes.198
This is not surprising. Using encrypted data transmitted
from the vessel to the receiver, the FMC, VMS is designed
specifically so that the FMCs “are the only ones empowered to
receive, validate, and distribute VMS data to whoever needs to
know (RFMOs, coastal states, etc.).”199 As a result, fishing
companies and captains can be confident that national

193. Id. ¶ 7.
194. ICCAT Recommendation 18-10, supra note 170, ¶ 8 (“CPCs are encouraged
to cooperate, as appropriate and in accordance with their domestic laws, by sharing data
reported under paragraph 1b to support Monitoring Control and Surveillance (‘MCS’)
activities.”).
195. Id.
196. NPFC CMM 2019-12, supra note 84, ¶¶ 14, 16.
197. WCPFC, Rules and Procedures for the Protection, Access to, and Dissemination of Data
Compiled by the Commission, supra note 16, paras. 23-24, Appendix 2; WCPFC, Rules and
Procedures for the Protection, Access to, and Dissemination of High Seas Non-Public Domain Data
and Information Compiled by the Commission for the Purpose of Monitoring, Control or
Surveillance (MCS) Activities and the Access to and Dissemination of High Seas VMS Data for
Scientific
Purposes,
para.
3
(2009),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/518/download?token=B6mW5ex9
[https://perma.cc/R976-AHD2]. See also WCPFC, Standards, Specifications and Procedures
(SSP) for the Fishing Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission
(WCPFC),
at
§§
6.6–6.8
(as
amended
through
2018),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/232703/download?token=wXsUrRdS
[https://perma.cc/Y57R-EKXA].
198. WCPFC, Rules and Procedures for the Protection, Access to, and Dissemination of High
Seas Non-Public Domain Data and Information, supra note 197, paras. 1, 31-39.
199. VMS or AIS for Sustainable Fisheries Management?, COLLECTE LOCALISATION
SATELLITES (July 3, 2020), https://fisheries.groupcls.com/vms-ais-sustainable-fisheries/
[https://perma.cc/NU45-YARW] (emphasis in original).
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authorities or RFMO secretariats do not publicly disclose the
vessel’s market-sensitive information, such as catch data and
vessel location.200 Nonetheless, this lack of transparency
undermines efforts to prevent IUU fishing.
C. Vessel-Based Catch Landing Data
1. The Need
Sustainable fisheries are critical to maintaining the longterm survival of the target species, to ensure a long-term food
supply, and to protect valuable economic resources.201 This is
particularly true for developing countries where fish may be the
major source of animal protein and where fisheries generate
significant economic benefits for both local and national
economies.202 To ensure sustainable fisheries, fisheries managers
need timely, complete, and reliable statistics on catch and fishing
effort.203 In addition, the data necessary for informed decisionmaking must be broad, vessel-specific, and collected over a period
of time.204
200. Id.
201. The FAO has written that “[t]he aim of many data collection programmes is
to monitor and assess the status of the stocks that are being exploited.” FAO, GUIDELINES
FOR THE ROUTINE COLLECTION OF CAPTURE FISHERY DATA 7 (1998) [hereinafter FAO,
GUIDELINES FOR ROUTINE COLLECTION]. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
provides that “[t]he right to fish carries with it the obligation to do so in a responsible
manner so as to ensure effective conservation and management of living aquatic
resources.” FAO, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES art. 6.1 (2011)
[hereinafter FAO, Code of Conduct].
202. Henrike Seidel & Padma N. Lal, Economic Value of the Pacific Ocean to the Pacific
Island
Countries
and
Territories,
§
4.2.2.2
(2010),
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/economic_value_of_the_pac
ific_ocean_to_the_pacific_island_countries_and_territories_p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X93C-6WCH]; FAO, GUIDELINES FOR ROUTINE COLLECTION, supra
note 201, at 3.
203. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries provides that:
States should ensure that timely, complete and reliable statistics on catch
and fishing effort are collected and maintained in accordance with
applicable international standards and practices and in sufficient detail to
allow sound statistical analysis. Such data should be updated regularly and
verified through an appropriate system.
FAO, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 201, art. 7.4.4.
204. See FAO, TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES 4: FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT § 2(i) (1997) (stating that “[t]he collection of data is not an end in itself,
but is essential for informed decision making.”).
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Fisheries managers need a broad range of data because the
sustainability or unsustainability of the catch can be determined
in different ways. As FAO explains:
Increasing overexploitation of resources may often be
detected by a combination of falling catch per unit effort,
falling total landings, decreasing mean weight of fish or
changes in the fish population age structure or species
composition. By maintaining a time series of catch per unit
effort and total landings by fleets (e.g. gear or boat category),
by commercial species group, fishing area and fishing season,
overfishing should be detectable . . .
Sophisticated methods, such as cohort analysis, based on
more detailed biological data may also be used. Data for these
methods usually comprise size, age, sex and maturity of fish
sampled from the catch. These data, routinely collected over
a long period, together with other scientific information on
fish growth and mortality, can produce accurate estimates of
the current state of the stock. Results from such stock
assessments should form the scientific foundation for advice
on conservation measures.
. . . Monitoring species, age and size composition, mean
lengths of species caught, habitat, by-catches (in particular
discards) allows management to assess the wider impacts of
fishing on the ecosystem.205

In particular, vessel-specific catch and effort data—data
frequently referred to as operational level data—are critical to
construct the most important indicators in most fisheries.206 In
fact, FAO explains that:
data should always be collected at the level of the most
detailed stratum, as it is always possible to aggregate, but
impossible to disaggregate data. For example, if fish lengthfrequency data were collected aggregated over each landing
day instead of trip, it may turn out later that on different trips
vessels were exploiting different stocks. As the length
frequency cannot be linked to particular trips, it would no
longer be possible to know from which stock they originated

205. FAO, GUIDELINES FOR ROUTINE COLLECTION, supra note 201, at 8.
206. Id. at 12.
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and stock assessment work using these data would be
unreliable. 207

These vessel-specific operational data are absolutely essential for
effective fisheries management to develop indices of abundance
for stock assessments and determine more precisely the
distribution spatial of the catch.208
Lastly, fisheries managers have long recognized the
importance to sustainable fisheries management of having data
collected consistently and routinely over a long period of time.209
With such data, for example, the WCPFC would have a better
understanding of declines in longline bigeye tuna.210 Without
these data, the FAO has reported that fisheries stakeholders are
forced to make assessments of fish stocks based on subjective
judgment and anecdotal information.211
2. The RFMO Rules
For all these reasons, it is critical that RMFO members
submit such vessel-specific data to the relevant RFMO consistent
with that RFMO’s requirements. Yet, not all of these RFMOs
require members to submit operational level data, and in any case
the data are not publicly disclosed.

207. Id. at 14.
208. The Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community
(SPC) has noted that operational data “are required for the development of indices of
abundance used in WCPFC stock assessments” and “to determine the spatial distribution
of the catch in relation to [exclusive economic zones (EEZs)], the high seas areas and
other management-related areas.” Peter Williams, Scientific Data Available to the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, WCPFC-SC9-2013/ST WP-1, para. 29 (2013)
[hereinafter, Data Gaps 2013]. The SPC is the WCPFC’s scientific service provider. The
WCPFC’s Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) with the SPC calls on the SPC to
provide scientific services, including data management services, to the WCPFC. Revised
Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 3 (Dec. 7-11, 2009) [hereinafter WCPFC–
SPC MoU].
209. FAO, GUIDELINES FOR ROUTINE COLLECTION, supra note 201, at 12 (stating
that “it is imperative to have long time series of data collected consistently and routinely
in order to evaluate trends in the behaviour of a variable.”).
210. Data Gaps 2013, supra note 208, para. 34.
211. Id. In addition, enforcement of fisheries conservation measures is more
difficult without these data. See id. (stating that “[e]nforcement may be assisted by using
data collected as an audit trail, from harvesting through processing to export or
consumption.”).
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The IATTC’s scientific staff must collect statistical and other
data from members,212 and members must submit data to the
IATTC.213 The IATTC only requires its members to submit fishing
data “by species and fishing gear, where practical, via vessel
logbooks and unloading records, and otherwise in aggregated
form” over a 5° longitude by 5° latitude area.214 The relevant CMM
provides that members may submit set-by-set data over a 1° by 1°
area—that is, the kind of operational data necessary for effective
long-term conservation of fish stocks—“whenever possible.”215
As with VMS data, catch information submitted to the IATTC
Secretariat must be “maintained in strict accordance with the
Commission’s rules and procedures on confidentiality.”216
IATTC’s resolution on confidentiality of catch statistics provides:
A resolution was adopted requiring that catch statistics of
individual boats, records of individual company operations,
and all other records obtained by the staff of the Commission
regarding individual persons, companies or enterprises shall
be kept completely confidential and shall be available only to
those members of the staff requiring access to them in the
course of the scientific investigations.217

Notwithstanding this resolution on confidentiality, members
must submit the required data, and the IATTC Secretariat must
report annual catches of species covered by the convention, “by
flag and gear,” although the Secretariat must pool catches from
companies of fewer than three vessels.218 Prior to any release of
catch, effort, and length-frequency data, however, the Secretariat
must group the data by 5° longitude 5° latitude by month by flag

212. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XIII(g).
213. IATTC, Resolution on Data Provision, Resolution C-03-05, para. 2 (2003),
https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-03-05Active_Provision%20of%20data.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJP6-JKL9].
214. Id. ¶ 2, 3 (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. Id. ¶ 7.
217. IATTC, Resolution on Confidentiality, Resolution C-51-01 (1951),
https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-51-01Active_Resolution%20on%20Confidentiality.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4LK-BCKW].
218. IATTC, Resolution on Catch Reporting, Resolution C-04-10 (2004),
https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-04-10Active_Catch%20reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/EWH6-SE7T].
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State.219 If an individual vessel, company, or individual can be
identified, then the Secretariat must aggregate data by time, area,
or flag to avoid such identification; only then can the Secretariat
release and place in the public domain such data.220 The release
of data at a finer level of time-area stratification requires the
written authorization of the source of the data and the express
permission of the IATTC Director.221 Only IATTC staff have
access to logbook and observer data, and only if their official
duties require access to such data.222 Nonetheless, catch data can
be found on the IATTC website.223
The ICCAT Convention directs ICCAT to collect and analyze
statistical data concerning the stocks it manages.224 The
convention also directs members to submit “any available
scientific, biological, and other scientific information.225 ICCAT
CMMs do not specify precisely how members are to report their
data. Nonetheless, they do refine somewhat the obligation
imposed by the convention. For example, members have agreed
“that it is essential that all countries fishing these Atlantic tuna
resources should collect adequate statistics on catch and fishing
effort and the necessary biological data, and make available for
publication the statistical and related economic data.”226
Members provide this information in annual reports: Part I
contains information on fisheries, research, and statistics
(including total catches, effort, catch per unit of effort, and sizefrequency data), while Part II includes information on
implementation and compliance with CMMs and other related
219. IATTC, Amendment to Resolution C-13-05 on Data Confidentiality Policy and
Procedures,
Resolution
C-15-07,
para.
1
(2015),
https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-15-07Active_Amends%20and%20replaces%20C-1305%20Procedures%20for%20confidential%20data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FBB2QTL8].
220. Id.
221. Id. ¶ 2.
222. Id. ¶ 4.
223. Catch
Reports,
Data,
Tagging
and
other
Reports,
IATTC,
https://www.iattc.org/CatchReportsDataENG.htm
[https://perma.cc/2XE8-EURL]
(last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
224. ICCAT Convention, supra note 21, art. IV(2).
225. Id. art. IX(2)(a).
226. ICCAT, Collection of Statistics on the Atlantic Tuna Fisheries, Resolution 66-01
(1966),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/1966-01-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XF72-3R99].
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activities.227 If a member cannot submit data by the relevant
deadline, then it should submit preliminary statistics.228 Members
should report and justify all revisions of historical scientific
data.229
Despite these requirements, it is clear that ICCAT does not
require members to submit vessel-specific operational data to
ICCAT. The ICCAT Secretariat has reported the following:
The level of fisheries data and their resolution requirements,
also varied in function of the gear type and target species. In
general for longline fleets they should submit information on
catch and effort by month with a 5x5 degrees [latitudelongitude] resolution, but for purse-seines it requires 1x1
degree spatial resolution. Operational data of each vessel[],
e.g. logbook records are normally collected by the Flag states
and summary/aggregated information is submitted to the
ICCAT Secretariat. Vessel-specific/trip-specific fisheries data
is not available at the Secretariat.230

NPFC Convention requires each member to submit annual
reports to the NPFC,231 and CMMs impose some data
requirements for specific species. For example, members must
divide data on chub mackerel catches by the convention area and
areas under national jurisdiction adjacent to the convention

227. ICCAT, Revised Guidelines for the Preparation of Annual Reports, Reference 12-13
(2012),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2012-13-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8U8-UMG8] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
228. ICCAT, Deadlines & Procedures for Data Submission, ICCAT Resolution 01-16,
para. 1 (2002), https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2001-16-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GMH5-HHVE] [hereinafter ICCAT, Deadlines & Procedures]. See also
ICCAT, Compliance with Statistical Reporting Obligations, Recommendation 05-09 (2006),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2005-09-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LK2-EPDV] [hereinafter ICCAT, Compliance with Statistical Reporting
Obligations] (requiring the Secretariat to prepare, as part of its report, a list of data
lacking for each stock, requiring CPCs to explain its reporting deficiencies, and directing
ICCAT’s Compliance Committee or Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of
ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG) to recommend action vis-à-vis a
CPC’s missing data).
229. ICCAT, Deadlines & Procedures, supra note 228, para. 3.
230. Email from Mauricio Ortiz, Head Research and Statistics Dept., ICCAT
Secretariat, to Chris Wold, Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School (Dec. 9, 2020) (on file
with author).
231. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 13(11).
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area.232 The most recent NPFC annual report describes a need for
additional data and data rules233 and indicates that the NPFC is
developing rules for data management. At its fifth annual
meeting, the NPFC endorsed the Interim Regulations for
Management of Scientific Data and Information234 developed and
adopted by its Scientific Committee,235 which establish a default
rule of public access to annual reports, working papers, and other
documents of the NPFC and its subsidiary bodies.236 The interim
regulations state, for example, that “[s]cientific data (e.g., catch
amount, number of vessels, number of fishing days and so on)
included in Members’ Annual Reports should be uploaded to the
public section of the NPFC website for public access and use.”237
However, the NPFC imposes “no requirements for NPFC
members to submit vessel-specific catch data” to the NPFC
Secretariat or the NPFC.238 Instead, members submit aggregated
data.239
The WCPF Convention, as with the other RFMOs reviewed,
provides that, “to conserve and manage highly migratory fish
stocks in the Convention Area,” each member must “collect and
share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate data
concerning fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position, catch of
target and non-target species and fishing effort . . . .”240 In
addition, the WCPFC has used its broad discretion to require
232. NPFC,
Chub
Mackerel,
CMM
2019-07,
para.
6
(2019),
https://www.npfc.int/system/files/2019-11/CMM%20201907%20FOR%20CHUB%20MACKEREL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJU6-A9GM].
233. NPFC, Report of the Fifth Commission Meeting, NPFC-2019-COM05-Final Report,
para. 69(q) (2019) (stating that members must “[s]hare more data of Pacific saury (e.g.
size-at-maturity measurements, catch-at-size data and catch-at-age data, etc.) for
improving the current stock assessment and developing future stock assessments after
the
SSC
PS
agrees
upon
the
type
and
resolution
of
data.”),
https://www.npfc.int/sites/default/files/2019-10/NPFC-2019-COM05Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SEU-4KD8].
234. See NPFC, Interim Regulations for Management of Scientific Data and Information,
NPFC-2019-COM05-WP08, in NPFC, supra note 232, at 82, Annex J.
235. NPFC CMM 2019-07, supra note 232, paras. 39–40.
236. Id. at 82-83.
237. Id. at 82. The NPFC does post this country-specific fisheries catch data on its
website. See Statistics, NPFC, https://www.npfc.int/statistics [https://perma.cc/M6ZR7QVV] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
238. Email from Dr. Alex Zavolokin, NPFC Sci. Manager, to Chris Wold, Professor,
Lewis & Clark Law Sch. (Dec. 23, 2020) (on file with author).
239. Id.
240. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 5(i).
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members to submit “such data and information as the
Commission may require”241 by requiring members to provide
data in accordance with the Scientific Committee’s document
Scientific Data to Be Provided to the Commission (“Scientific Data
Document”).242 The Scientific Data Document details, among other
things, the requirements for the submission of “operational level
catch and effort data.”243 These data include “individual sets by
longliners and purse seiners, and individual days fished by poleand-line vessels and trollers.”244 It further specifies that members
“shall” report vessel trip information, including the time a vessel
left port to transit to a fishing area or recommences fishing after
transshipping part or all of the catch at sea.245 Members must also
report the port and date of departure,246 as well as a range of other
information indicating that members must submit vessel-specific
and trip-specific data.247
The Scientific Data Document includes an exception to the
submission of operational data for those members that have
“domestic legal constraints” that prevent them from submitting
operational data.248 Until recently, the Asian fleets used this
exception to submit only aggregated data.249 Even so, the
WCPFC’s Rules and Procedures for the Protection, Access to, and
Dissemination of Data Compiled by the Commission (Rules and
Procedures) clearly identify operational data as confidential non241. Id. art. 23(2)(a).
242. WCPFC, Scientific Data to be Provided to the Commission, WCPFC13 § 1 (2016),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/115986/download?token=fww6OtHi
[https://perma.cc/B8J2-L46R] [hereinafter Scientific Data Document].
243. Id. § 3.
244. Id.
245. Id. Annex 1, § 1.2.
246. Id.
247. Id. Annex 1, §§ 1.3-1.6 (requiring, e.g., CCMs to report information for each
vessel each day, “from the start of the trip to the end of the trip,” the weight of fish caught
each day for a variety of species, and even the vessel’s noon position). See generally Wold
et al., supra note 17.
248. The provision reads in full:
It is recognized that certain members and cooperating non-members of
the Commission may be subject to domestic legal constraints, such that
they may not be able to provide operational data to the Commission until
such constraints are overcome. Until such constraints are overcome,
aggregated catch and effort data and size composition data, as described
in (4) and (5) below, shall be provided.
Scientific Data Document, supra note 242, § 3.
249. See Wold et al., supra note 17, at 247-56.
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public domain data.250 In contrast, these Rules and Procedures
characterize annual catch estimates stratified by gear, flag, and
species, as public domain data.251 Nonetheless, even if the public
is unable to obtain operational level data, the members must
submit them, and the science providers to the commission are
able to access them to provide advice for the long-term
conservation of the stocks.252
D. Compliance Monitoring
1. The Need
Deterring IUU fishing and achieving the long-term
conservation of fish stocks require effective compliance
procedures; without effective compliance, fishers have no
disincentive to engage in IUU fishing. Transparency has an
important role in relation to compliance and enforcement data,
not only for assessing the effectiveness of CMMs, but also for
maintaining the reputation and legitimacy of the RFMOs
themselves.
ICCAT has specifically linked its compliance regime to IUU
fishing and a need for greater transparency. In the preamble to
one of its compliance CMMs, it notes that IUU fishing
“compromises the objectives” of the ICCAT Convention and
undermines the effectiveness of ICCAT CMMs.253 In a separate
compliance CMM, ICCAT has noted that, “in a responsible, open,
transparent and non-discriminatory manner, the Commission
should be made aware of any and all available information that
may be relevant to the work of the Commission in identifying and
holding accountable instances of non-compliance with
management measures.”254
250. WCPFC, Rules and Procedures for the Protection, Access to, and Dissemination of Data
Compiled by the Commission, supra note 16, Appx. 2, para. 1.
251. See id. Appx. 4, para. 2.
252. See id. para. 34.3.
253. ICCAT, Promote Compliance by Nations of Contracting Parties, Cooperating Noncontracting Parties, Entities, or Fishing Entities with ICCAT Conservation and Management
Measures,
Recommendation
06-14
(2007),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2006-14-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5CS-A8JB].
254. See ICCAT, Establish a Process for the Review and Reporting of Compliance
Information,
Recommendation
08-09
(2009),
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While not expressly linking its compliance mechanism to the
prevention of IUU fishing or the long-term conservation of fish
stocks, the WCPFC acknowledges that “in a responsible, open,
transparent and non-discriminatory manner,” making
compliance information available will assist “in identifying and
holding accountable instances of non-compliance” by
members.255 The IATTC has specifically linked the need for
improved compliance to the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of the fish stocks covered by the Convention.256
2. The RFMO Rules
Compliance monitoring has two distinct components to it
within these four RFMOs. The first component relates to a
member’s implementation of the relevant convention and CMMs.
The second relates to a member’s enforcement of the convention
and CMMs against the vessels it flags.
With respect to implementation, each of the four RFMOs has
clear rules that require each member to take the measures
necessary to ensure the implementation of and compliance with
the convention and CMMs.257 To ensure that members are, in
fact, complying, these RFMOs requires each member to submit
catch statistics, legal and administrative provisions, and other
information to demonstrate implementation and compliance
with the relevant convention and CMMs.258 As a general rule,
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2008-09-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN2Q-B6LK].
255. See WCPFC, Compliance Monitoring Scheme, CMM 2019-06 (2019),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/391422/download?token=_FXgivFw
[https://perma.cc/4X8T-LD5H].
256. See IATTC, Process for Improved Compliance of Resolutions Adopted by the
Commission,
Resolution
C-11-07,
1
(2011),
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-11-07Active_Compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y2S-LAEJ].
257. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVIII(1). Although Article XVIII
technically only applies to Antigua Convention contracting parties, Article XIX applies
Article XVIII, mutatis mutandis, to fishing entities that are members of the Commission.
ICCAT Convention, supra note 21, art. IX(1); NPFC, supra note 22, arts. 13, 16(3); WCPF
Convention, supra note 23, art. 5(j).
258. Antigua Convention, for example, provides that members must submit “all the
information that may be required for the fulfillment of the objective of this Convention,
including statistical and biological information and information concerning its fishing
activities in the convention area, and shall provide to the Commission information
regarding actions taken to implement the measures adopted in accordance with this
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members provide this information to the relevant commission in
an annual report.259
Members of these RFMOs are also specifically directed to
ensure that the vessels they flag comply with the provisions of the
convention and CMMs.260 Members frequently task onboard
observers with monitoring vessel compliance with the convention
and CMMs.261
To facilitate compliance, these RFMOs have all established
compliance mechanisms. For the IATTC’s Implementation
Committee, each member must, subject to any applicable rules of
confidentiality, authorize the use and release of relevant
information from on-board observers.262 Moreover, each member
must ensure that vessel owners and/or captains allow the IATTC
to collect and analyze information necessary for carrying out the
Convention.” Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVIII(3). In addition, each must
submit to the IATTC:
(a) legal and administrative provisions, including those regarding infractions and
sanctions, applicable to compliance with conservation and management measures
adopted by the Commission;
(b) actions taken to ensure compliance with conservation and management
measures adopted by the Commission, including, if appropriate, an analysis of
individual cases and the final decision taken.”
Id. art. XVIII(3). See also WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 23 (including provisions
similar to those of the Antigua Convention).
259. See, e.g., Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVIII(4)(c); NPFC, supra note
22, art. 16(3); WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 23(2)(a). As an example of the
language use, the WCPF Convention provides:
Each member of the Commission shall take such measures as may be necessary to
ensure that:
(a) fishing vessels flying its flag comply with the provisions of this Convention and
the conservation and management measures adopted pursuant hereto and that
such vessels do not engage in any activity which undermine the effectiveness of such
measures; and
(b) fishing vessels flying its flag do not conduct unauthorized fishing within areas
under the national jurisdiction of any Contracting Party.
WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 23(2).
260. See Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVIIIXVIII; NPFC, supra note 22,
art. 13; WCPF Convention, supra note 23, arts. 24, 25(2), 25(4); see also ICCAT
Recommendation 06-14, supra note 253. ICCAT’s provisions on flag State enforcement
are scattered among many different recommendations. For example, para. 1 directs
members to take “appropriate measures” to investigate any natural or legal person
subject to their jurisdiction alleged to have engaged in IUU fishing, as defined by
Recommendation 18-08, and take appropriate action if that person has done so.
261. See, e.g., NPFC, supra note 22, art. 13(6); WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art.
28.
262. Antigua Convention, supra note 20, art. XVIII(4)(a).
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functions of the Implementation Committee.263 Each member
must also submit a report every six months on the activities of its
fishing vessels for evaluation by the Committee.264 In the event of
a finding of non-compliance by a vessel, the flag State member
must impose “sanctions of sufficient gravity as to be effective in
securing compliance” with the relevant CMM or Convention
provision and “deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from
their illegal activities, including, as appropriate, refusal,
suspension or withdrawal of the authorization to fish.”265
Consistent with the reporting obligations of the Antigua
Convention described above,266 any sanctions applied must be
reported to the Implementation Committee. In addition, the
Secretariat prepares a questionnaire on compliance with relevant
IATTC resolutions that members complete as part of the review
process.267 The Implementation Committee reviews this
information and prepares a compliance record for each member
for review by the IATTC.268 The Implementation Committee’s
recommendations may include sanctions and incentives to
improve compliance.269
ICCAT has established a Compliance Committee that
reviews and evaluates each member’s compliance with the ICCAT
Convention and CMMs.270 The Committee’s compliance
evaluation is based on member reports submitted to the
Secretariat on actions and measures taken against those engaged
in IUU fishing, “subject to the national laws of confidentiality,”271
in addition to other information.272 Members should also submit

263. Id. art. XVIII(4)(b).
264. Id. art. XVIII(4)(c).
265. Id. art. XVIII(8).
266. See supra note 258.
267. See IATTC Resolution C-11-07, supra note 256, para. 3(a).
268. See id. paras. 4-5.
269. See id. para. 9.
270. ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT to Amend the Mandate and Terms of Reference
Adopted by the Commission for the ICCAT Conservation and Management Measures Compliance
Committee
(CoC),
Recommendation
11–24,
para.
3
(2012),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2011-24-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5P8Z-C5EE].
271. ICCAT Recommendation 06-14, supra note 253, para. 2.
272. See ICCAT, Facilitate an Effective and Efficient Compliance Process, Resolution 1622 (2016), https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2016-22-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BE7G-W3A6] (providing, for example, that the Secretariat compiles

1012 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

information to the Committee about “possible noncompliance”273 and, “consistent with domestic laws,” shall provide
the ICCAT Secretariat with the findings of any investigation taken
in relation to the allegations of non-compliance and any actions
taken to address compliance concerns.274 If such an investigation
is ongoing, members shall advise the Executive Secretary of the
expected length of the investigation and provide periodic
updates on their progress until complete.275 Moreover, members
are required to “review their own internal actions and measures
taken . . . , including punitive and sanction actions and in a
manner consistent with domestic law as regards disclosure, report
any relevant results of the review to the Commission at its annual
meeting.”276 If the Committee finds areas of non-compliance that
need to be addressed, it may make recommendations to ICCAT277
“for consideration and appropriate action,”278 including
directing the flag members to take further action to enhance
compliance with ICCAT CMMs by specific vessels.279
The NPFC Convention establishes a Technical and
Compliance Committee (“TCC”) to monitor and review
compliance with NPFC CMMs and implementation of
cooperative measures for monitoring, control, surveillance, and
enforcement.280 The NPFC’s TCC receives reports from each
member relating to measures taken “to monitor, investigate and
penalize violations of provisions of this Convention and measures
adopted pursuant to this Convention.”281 Based on those reports,
the NPFC’s TCC makes and reports its recommendations to the
NPFC.282

an inventory of compliance information for each CPC for the Compliance Committee to
review.).
273. ICCAT Recommendation 06-14, supra note 253, para. 1 (indicating that
information must be submitted at least 120 days before the relevant annual meeting).
274. Id. para. 3 (providing that information must be submitted at least 30 days
before the annual meeting).
275. Id.
276. ICCAT Recommendation 13–13, supra note 67, para. 6.
277. Id. para. 2. For more on the process for assessing a CPC’s compliance, see
ICCAT, Resolution 16-22, supra note 272.
278. ICCAT Resolution 16-22, supra note 272, para. 8.
279. See ICCAT, Recommendation 13–13, supra note 67, para. 6.
280. NPFC Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(1).
281. Id. art. 11(4)(c).
282. Id. arts. 7(2), 11(4)(d)-(e).
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To assist the NPFC and its TCC in fulfilling their compliancerelated duties, the NPFC Secretariat prepares a Draft Compliance
Report based on information from a variety of information
sources, including each member’s annual report.283 In their
annual report, members must provide a range of information,
such as a statement of action taken “in response to boarding and
inspections of their fishing vessels that resulted in observation of
alleged violations, including any proceedings instituted and
sanctions applied.”284 Each member must provide information,
clarifications, and corrections to any potential compliance issue
raised in the Draft Compliance Report,285 and then the
Secretariat prepares and publishes a revised Draft Compliance
Report on the non-public section of the NPFC’s website.286 Based
on the revised Draft Compliance Report, the NPFC’s TCC
prepares a provisional compliance report,287 which it forwards to
the NPFC,288 which in turn becomes the Final Compliance Report
after adoption.289 The NPFC’s binding CMM on compliance
provides that the Draft and Provisional Compliance Reports, and
all associated documentation, “shall constitute non-public
domain data,” but that the Final Compliance Report and the
executive summary “shall be public domain data.”290
Nonetheless, the Final Compliance Reports are not available on
the NPFC’s website.
The WCPFC requires members to, among other things, take
measures to ensure that nationals and vessels owned by its
nationals,291 as well as vessels it flags,292 comply with the
convention and CMMs. At the request of another member, a

283. NPFC, Conservation and Management Measure For The Compliance Monitoring
Scheme, CMM 2019-13, para. 8 (2019), https://www.npfc.int/cmm-2019-13-compliancemonitoring-scheme [https://perma.cc/NY7G-T3F4].
284. NPFC, Conservation and Management Measure For High Seas Boarding and
Inspection Procedures for the North Pacific Fisheries Commission, CMM 2017-09 para. 42
(2017),
https://www.npfc.int/cmm-2017-09-high-seas-boarding-and-inspectionprocedures-npfc [https://perma.cc/9SYD-4RYC].
285. NPFC CMM 2019-13, supra note 283, para. 10(a).
286. Id. paras. 11-12.
287. Id. paras. 13-14.
288. Id. para. 17.
289. Id. para. 18.
290. Id. para. 21.
291. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 23(5).
292. Id. art. 24(1).
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member must investigate any alleged violation and report to both
that other CCM and the WCPFC any action taken or proposed to
be taken in response to the alleged violation.293 When sufficient
evidence indicates that a violation has occurred, the flag State
must institute proceedings without delay.294 Any penalties must be
“adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and
to discourage violations.”295 Importantly, each member must
transmit to the WCPFC an annual statement of compliance
measures taken, including any sanctions imposed.296
The WCPF Convention also establishes a Technical and
Compliance Committee (“TCC”)297 to help the members
monitor and review compliance with identified provisions of
CMMs.298 As part of the WCPFC’s Compliance Monitoring
Scheme (“CMS”), the WCPFC Secretariat prepares individual
draft Compliance Monitoring Reports for each member based on
annual reports, VMS information, transshipment reports, and
other documents.299 To determine whether members are taking
action against vessels alleged to be in non-compliance, the
Secretariat maintains an online compliance file system that tracks
alleged violations,300 which members must update as an

293. Id. art. 25(2).
294. Id. art. 25(3).
295. Id. art. 25(7).
296. Id. art. 25(8).
297. Id. art. 11(1).
298. Id. art. 14(1)(b). WCPFC adopted the Compliance Monitoring Scheme
(“CMS”) to establish a process for identifying which provisions to assess for compliance.
WCPFC, supra note 254, paras. 1-2, 6.
299. WCPFC CMM 2019-06, supra note 255, paras. 22-23. CMM 2019-06 provides
that the draft Compliance Monitoring Reports will be sourced form documents, such as
the following:
i. information available to the Commission through data collection
programmes, including but not limited to, high seas transshipment reports,
Regional Observer Programme data and information, Vessel Monitoring
System information, High Seas Boarding and Inspection Scheme reports, and
charter notifications;
ii. information contained in an Annual Report which is not available through
other means; and
iii. where appropriate, any additional suitably documented information
regarding compliance during the previous calendar year.
Id. para. 23.
300. Id. para. 9. CCMs must respond to the following questions with respect to
alleged violations by vessels it flags:
(a) Has an investigation been started? (Yes/No)
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investigation progresses until that investigation reaches a
conclusion.301
The WCPFC’s TCC reviews the draft Compliance Monitoring
Report prepared by the Secretariat and, after reaching agreement
on its contents, forwards a Provisional Compliance Monitoring
Report to the WCPFC for decision.302 Draft and Provisional
Compliance Monitoring Reports constitute non-public domain
data, and the Final Compliance Monitoring Report constitutes
public domain data.303 Regardless of whether or not the Draft
Monitoring Report is confidential, each member is required to
submit information in order for the relevant WCPFC bodies to
complete their work on the Compliance Monitoring Report.
V. IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY TO MINIMIZE IUU FISHING
AND ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF FISH STOCKS
IUU fishers are abetted by the lack of transparency within
RFMOs and at the national level.304 As FAO has concluded, a lack
of transparency facilitates a range of behavior that causes IUU
fishing and undermines the long-term conservation and
management of fish stocks.305 Consequently, it is vital to fisheries
management and food security that RFMOs adopt strong rules to
ensure the transparency of fisheries information, including
information relating to vessel ownership, the reporting of catch
data, VMS, and the reporting of sanctions and other compliance

(b) If yes, what is the current status of the investigation? (Ongoing,
Completed)
(c) If the alleged violations stem from an observer report, have you obtained
the observer report? (Yes/No)
(d) If no, what steps have you taken to obtain the observer report?
(e) What was the outcome of the investigation? (Closed – no violation;
Infraction – not charged; Infraction – charged)
(f) If no violation, provide brief explanation
(g) If infraction, but not charged, provide brief explanation
(h) If infraction charged, how was it charged (e.g., penalty/fine, permit
sanction, verbal or written warning, etc.) and level of charged (e.g., penalty
amount, length of sanction, etc.).
Id. para. 10.
301. Id. para. 11.
302. Id. paras. 31-32.
303. Id. para. 8.
304. See supra Section IV.
305. FAO, STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 141, at 105.
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issues. In addition, RFMO members must comply with those
requirements.
In recent years, members have rejected proposals to increase
transparency in these RFMOs by increasing observer coverage on
longline vessels306 and improving reporting of transshipment
events on the high seas.307 In the IATTC, the Republic of Korea
and Chinese Taipei, along with other IATTC members, objected
to a proposal to increase observer coverage on longline vessels to
20%, ostensibly due to costs and the lack of sufficient numbers of
observers.308 The Republic of Korea, China,309 and Chinese
Taipei310 have also opposed prohibitions against high seas
transshipment in the WCPFC convention area as costly and
unnecessary. The Republic of Korea opposed observer coverage
on both the carrier and longline vessels during transshipment.311
China and Japan have also opposed additional rules relating to
high seas transshipment.312 More broadly, the NPFC has

306. See, e.g., WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure to Mitigate the Impact of
Fishing for Highly Migratory Fish Stocks on Seabirds, CMM 2018-03, para. 4 (2018),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/227140/download?token=WIfcidLy
[https://perma.cc/76QV-6FVQ] (“Those SIDS and Territories that have vessels
operating south of 250 South are encouraged to collect data on seabird interactions,
increase observer coverage rate as appropriate, and implement seabird mitigation
measures when they operate within their EEZs.”).
307. Chris Wold & Alfred “Bubba” Cook, Observer Reporting of Transhipments in the
WCPFC,
WCPFC16-2019-OP07
(2019),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/362282/download?token=yKqpKkX3
[https://perma.cc/BRZ8-HMY8].
308. IATTC, Minutes of the 93rd Meeting of the IATTC, 10 (2018),
https://www.iattc.org/Meetings/Meetings2018/IATTC-93/Docs/_English/IATTC-93MINS_93rd-Meeting-of-the-IATTC.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5VZ-GW2U].
309. See, e.g., WCPFC, Fourteenth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance
Committee
Majuro,
Republic
of
Marshall
Islands,
para.
196
(2018),
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/TCC14%20Summary%20Report%20Final_30%20
Nov.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD9G-A68Z] (“Korea expressed agreement with the
statement by China, and noted that it was not feasible to require longline vessels to meet
the same observer obligations as purse seine vessels. It noted that Korea has well-trained
observers on its carrier vessels, and very strong MCS tools, with very good monitoring
and tracking.”).
310. See id. para. 199 (“Chinese Taipei stated that high seas transhipment is a
globally common practice, and supported its regulation, but not a ban, while noting that
any illegal activities should be addressed.”).
311. Id. para. 196.
312. Id. paras. 194, 197. The WCPFC has established a Transhipment Working
Group to explore ways to improve transshipment reporting, among other things. For
documentation relating to the WCPFC transhipment working group, see IWG–
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prohibited observers to attend its small working group meetings,
which are being held virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.313
With respect to the issues assessed in this report, the
conclusions are mixed. On the whole, members of the RFMOs,
including those claiming that privacy laws prevent them from
submitting some types of information, are in fact fulfilling their
responsibilities to submit vessel information, require their vessels
to use VMS, and provide vessel-specific catch landing data.
However, the rules of the RFMOs are often inadequate to provide
a level of transparency needed to prevent IUU fishing. As
described below, the RFMOs assessed in this report do not
require RFMO members to submit the names of the beneficial
owners of vessels authorized to fish in the RFMO convention
areas. In addition, the RFMOs do not disclose information
regarding compliance issues. While it is possible to determine
generally that a member is in compliance, it is not possible to
determine on what basis the members made those conclusions or
the extent to which vessels have been penalized for infractions.
A. Vessel Registration
Among the most important actions that RFMOs can take to
lift the veil of secrecy in fisheries management is to require and
record accurate information concerning the beneficial
ownership of vessels.314 If the vessel “owner” is listed as a
corporation, that corporation may very well be a shell corporation
used to hide the identities of beneficial owners.315 That shell
corporation may be owned by other shell corporations spread
across multiple jurisdictions, thus making prosecutions for any
wrongdoing extremely difficult.316
In that regard, the RFMOs reviewed here are failing to adopt
the necessary measures to ensure compliance with CMMs and
Transhipment,
WCPFC,
https://www.wcpfc.int/iwg-transhipment
[https://perma.cc/RBC5-R3PU] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
313. Rachel Hopkins, Fisheries Bodies Should Be More Transparent in Decision-Making,
Not
Less,
PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2020/09/08/fisheries-bodies-should-be-more-transparent-in-decisionmaking-not-less [https://perma.cc/S4FZ-NW7K].
314. See NAFIG & INTERPOL, supra note 7, at 64-65.
315. Id. at 24-25.
316. Id.
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prevent IUU fishing. None of the RFMOs assessed in this report
require their members to submit information on beneficial
ownership.317 Instead, they require members to submit the name
and address of the owner or owners.318
While not comprehensively reviewing each of the thousands
of vessels included in the vessel registers of these four RFMOs, a
meaningful search indicates that the vast majority of vessel owners
are listed as corporations. In the WCPFC, for example, only one
vessel was found that named an individual as the owner—for the
purse seiner 1 Sooduck Ho, the owner is listed as Park Byeong
Ho.319 In ICCAT320 and the IATTC,321 most, if not all, vessels are
registered under corporate names, not the names of the
beneficial owners; this Author found no records listing an
individual as the vessel owner. In the NPFC, members appear to
be submitting all the required information, but the publicly
available vessel register does not record the owner of the vessel.322
Information from the compliance regimes of the IATTC,
ICCAT, NPFC, and WCPFC indicates that members are fulfilling
317. See supra Section IV.A.
318. Id.
319. WCPFC
Record
of
Fishing
Vessels:
1
Sooduck
Ho,
WCPFC
https://www.wcpfc.int/node/13144 [https://perma.cc/Z3Y6-PTUK] (last visited Feb.
18, 2021).
320. See,
e.g.,
ICCAT
Record
of
Vessels,
ICCAT,
https://www.iccat.int/en/vesselsrecord.asp99 [https://perma.cc/YL7A-RSZS] (last
visited Feb. 18, 2021) (recording the name and address of the owner of the Koreanflagged Kova as Dongwon Industries and recording the name and address of the owner
of the Chinese Taipei-flagged Chun Fa No. 99 as Chen Feng Fishery Co., Ltd.).
321. See,
e.g.,
IATTC
Vessel
Record,
IATTC,
https://www.iattc.org/VesselRegister/VesselDetails.aspx?VesNo=8261&Lang=en
[https://perma.cc/6UPW-CZR6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (recording the name and
address of the owner of the Korean-flagged Oryong No. 315 as Sajo Industries Company,
Ltd.).
See
also
IATTC
Vessel
Record,
https://www.iattc.org/VesselRegister/VesselDetails.aspx?VesNo=16357&Lang=en
[https://perma.cc/RV49-DQ4K] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (recording the name and
address of the owner of the Chinese Taipei-flagged Da Sheng as Jong Shyn Shipbuilding
Company, Ltd.).
322. See, e.g., NPFC Vessel Register, https://www.npfc.int/vessels/1337NPFC
https://www.npfc.int/vessels/1337 [https://perma.cc/R772-3H4B] (last visited Feb. 18,
2021) (recording the Korean-flagged 101 Haerang as authorized to fish in the NPFC
convention area but not recording the name and address of the owner of the vessel). An
Fong No. 116, NPFC, https://www.npfc.int/vessels/91 [https://perma.cc/396J-BM8R]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (recording the Chinese Taipei-flagged An Fong No. 116 as
authorized to fish in the NPFC convention area but not recording the name and address
of the owner of the vessel).
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their responsibilities to submit the required information
concerning their vessels.323 Thus, even if RFMO members are
fulfilling their responsibilities to submit information concerning
vessels to the relevant RFMO, the RFMO members are not
adopting requirements for vessel registration and the submission
of information regarding beneficial ownership of vessels to
improve transparency and better prevent IUU fishing.
B. VMS
Many fishers believe that public disclosure of VMS data may
reveal important fishing grounds to other fishers.324 However, the
International Maritime Organization already requires many large
vessels, including fishing vessels, to use an automatic
identification system (“AIS”),325 which is publicly available and
reveals the location of vessels. 326 Given increasing surveillance of
IUU fishing, the failure to operate VMS may “raise suspicion
among authorities and draw attention to illegal activity.”327
323. See, e.g., WCPFC, Summary Report of the WCPFC’s Sixteenth Annual Meeting, 23439
(2020),
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/Final%20WCPFC16%20Summary%20Report%20as
%20at%202%20Apr%202020_opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4AM-NP7F] [hereinafter
WCPFC16 Summary Report]. No information was found in the documents of the other
three RFMOs to indicate that members were failing to submit the required vessel
information.
324. Are There Concerns about Sharing VMS Data?, GLOBAL FISHING WATCH,
https://globalfishingwatch.org/faqs/are-there-concerns-about-sharing-vms-data/
[https://perma.cc/5XUU-V5CV] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
325. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Revised Guidelines for the Onboard Operational Use of
Shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), Resolution A.1106(29) (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/ais/references/IMO_A1106_29_Revised_guidelines
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RMJ-5WHW] (“[R]egulation V/19 of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires all ships of 300 gross tonnage
and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and
upwards not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size to
be fitted with . . . AIS . . . .”).
326. AIS was not developed for fisheries purposes; rather, it was developed to show
the location of vessels to avoid collisions. In order to do that, the data is publicly available.
Jean-Pierre Cauzac, VMS or AIS for Sustainable Fisheries Management?, COLLECTE
LOCALISATION SATELLITES (July 3, 2020), https://fisheries.groupcls.com/vms-aissustainable-fisheries/ [https://perma.cc/T5TN-ZCZH]. It is, in fact, one important
source of data that Global Fishing Watch uses to track fishing vessels. What is Global
Fishing Watch’s VMS Transparency Initiative?, GLOBAL FISHING WATCH,
https://globalfishingwatch.org/faqs/what-is-global-fishing-watchs-vms-transparencyinitiative/ [https://perma.cc/RQ66-VKAD] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
327. GLOBAL FISHING WATCH, supra note 324.
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Despite moves to make VMS data publicly available,328 VMS
data remains confidential in the IATTC, ICCAT, NPFC, and
WCPFC.329 Moreover, in the IATTC and ICCAT, the information
is transmitted from the vessel to the flag State, and the flag State
is not required to forward the data to the relevant commission.330
Only in the WCPFC do vessels transmit VMS data directly to the
Secretariat.331
Despite the requirement in the WCPFC to report VMS data
directly to the Secretariat, WCPFC members have noted that
“VMS non-reporting to the Commission . . . has been a longstanding issue” and that “the problem is worsening, with . . .
patrols detecting significant numbers of vessels that are not
reporting to the Commission VMS.332 Other members have noted
the need to reduce the number of “dark” vessels—those
operating without VMS.333
C. Vessel-based Catch Landing Data
In the past, the Asian fleets have resisted the submission of
operational fisheries data to RFMOs.334 Beginning in 2017, Japan
and the Republic of Korea began submitting operational data to
the WCPFC rather than aggregate data,335 while Chinese Taipei
submitted some operational data336 and a significant amount of
logbook data.337 By 2018, Chinese Taipei began submitting
328. See GLOBAL FISHING WATCH, supra note 165.
329. See supra Section IV.B.
330. See supra Section IV.B.
331. Id.
332. WCPFC, Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Technical and Compliance Committee,
para.
204
(2019),
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC16-2019TCC15%20TCC15%20Summary%20Report_issued%201%20December.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FU59-73A8] (statement of the Cook Islands on behalf of the 17
members of the Forum Fisheries Agency).
333. Id. para. 208 (statement of the United States).
334. See Wold et al., supra note 17, at 239 (describing the history of lack of
submission of operational data by Asian fleets, particularly Japan and the Republic of
Korea, in the WCPFC).
335. Data Gaps 2013, supra note 208, para. 19 (“Provision of operational data (100%
coverage) for the Korean Longline and Purse seine fleets for 2014, 2015 and 2016.
Significantly, the logbook data for recent years have been collected through an EReporting initiative established by Korea.”).
336. Id. para. 45.
337. Id. (“Provision of 2016 logbook data for the Chinese Taipei longline fleet, for
the first time. Coverage is currently very low, but Chinese Taipei has advised that of
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operational data.338 In the WCPFC, “the provision of historical
operational data for the Asian tuna fleets (China, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei) remain the main data gaps.”339
The provision of operational data by the Asian fleets is indeed a
significant development to improve fisheries management.340
Significantly, Chinese Taipei specifically noted that it can now
submit operational data because it has removed the domestic
legal constraints that it claimed prevented it from doing so.341 The
Republic of Korea has not made a similar comment, but notably
it began submitting operational data after the submission of a
paper to the WCPFC concluding that it did not have domestic
legal constraints that prevented it from submitting such data to
the WCPFC.342 The Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei are
apparently submitting some operational data to ICCAT,343
although it is not required to do so.344
However, the IATTC does not require the submission of
operational level data, only aggregated data,345 and IATTC

January 2017, their domestic constraint has been lifted so logbook data can be provided
in the future – this is another very positive development.”).
338. Peter Williams, Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission,
WCPFC-SC14-2018/ST-WP-01
Rev.
1,
¶
19
(2018),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/218151/download?token=uRNxxhlw
[https://perma.cc/G3K5-LZLK] [hereinafter Data Gaps 2018].
339. Id. para. 46.
340. Id. para. 20 (“The operational catch and effort data submitted for the China,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei fleets in recent years are by far the most
significant developments in resolving operational data gaps since the establishment of
the Commission.”).
341. Peter Williams, Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission, WCPFC-SC13-2017/ST-WP-01, para. 44 (2017) (“Advice from Chinese
Taipei that the domestic constraints that have previously prevented them from
submitting operational data have been recently resolved and some operational longline
catch/effort data were provided this year.”).
342. CHRIS WOLD ET AL., REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL DATA ANALYSIS 1
(2015).
343. ICCAT, Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics, in 2 REPORT
FOR THE BIENNIAL PERIOD 2018-19: PART II 46 (2020) (noting that with respect to bigeye
and yellowfin tuna, the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei “[t]he main change from
the previous assessment was the development and use of a single Joint Longline
standardized abundance index (Hoyle et al., 2019) instead of each individual CPC’s
standardized CPUE indices used in the 2015 assessment. The joint longline standardized
index for 1959-2017 was constructed using detailed operational data of major longline
fleets (Japan, Korea, United States and Chinese Taipei.”)).
344. See supra Section IV.C.2.
345. See supra Section IV.C.2.
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Secretariat staff confirm that the Republic of Korea and Chinese
Taipei do not submit operational level data.346 The NPFC does
not require its members to submit operational level data.347
D. Compliance Mechanisms
Despite calls for transparent compliance regimes, the
compliance regimes of these four RFMOs are far from
transparent. Outside observers cannot verify whether an RFMO
member has taken relevant action against its vessels found to be
in non-compliance because the publicly available Final
Compliance Monitoring Reports do not have sufficient detail. In
the WCPFC, for example, the Final Compliance Monitoring
Report consists of a table that indicates whether or not the CCM
is compliant, non-compliant, or priority non-compliant for those
obligations assessed in that year.348 No narrative accompanies the
table to determine how the WCPFC reached its conclusions.
Compliance information is not publicly available for the IATTC349
or NPFC;350 only some ICCAT information is available.
Based on the limited available evidence, it appears that the
Asian fleets are, for the most part, complying with their
obligations. For example, in ICCAT, the Republic of Korea has

346. E-mail from Chris Wold to Brad Wiley, IATTC Policy Officer (Oct. 2020) (on
file with author).
347. See supra Section IV.C.2.
348. See, e.g., WCPFC, WCPFC16 Summary Report, supra note 323, at 218-44. A CCM
is considered “priority non-compliant” with an obligation if any of the following have
occurred, as applicable:
a. exceeded quantitative limit established by the Commission;
b. failure to submit its Part II Annual Report;
c. repeated non-compliance with an obligation for two or more consecutively
assessed years; or
d. any other non-compliance identified as Priority Non-Compliance by the
Commission.
WCPFC CMM 2019-06, supra note 255, Annex 1.
349. See, e.g., IATTC and AIDCP Annual Meetings, IATTC (July 2017),
https://www.iattc.org/Meetings/Meetings2017/IATTC-92/IATTC-AIDCP-AnnualMeetings-JUL2017ENG.htm [https://perma.cc/7DGA-78GH] (blocking access to the
document “Compliance 2016”).
350. See, e.g., Review of the CCMs and the recommendations by the Committees, NFPC,
https://www.npfc.int/meetings/5th-annual-session-commission/71-review-cmms-andrecommendations-committees [https://perma.cc/4RWT-QCP9] (last visited Feb. 28,
2021) (blocking access to Conservation Management Measure for the Compliance
Monitoring Scheme, NPFC-2019-COM05-WP12 (Rev 3)).
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been largely in compliance with the CMMs reviewed by the
ICCAT Compliance Committee. In 2017, the Compliance
Committee reported that the Republic of Korea submitted a
report late351 and had no issues of non-compliance in 2018.352 For
the 2017 violation for failing to submit data (“Task 1 data”),
however, ICCAT did impose on the Republic of Korea
prohibitions against retaining certain species.353 Chinese Taipei
did not have any compliance issues for these two years.354 The
compliance report did note that perhaps some transshipment
issues arose in 2017 for both the Republic of Korea and Chinese
Taipei, but ICCAT has not made the documents in which those
issues are discussed publicly available.355 ICCAT documents from
2020 do not show any possible infringements relating to the
vessels of the Republic of Korea or Chinese Taipei.356 In addition,
Chinese Taipei reported that it had imposed sanctions on and
deregistered the vessel Yu Fong 168 and asked ICCAT members
for assistance in locating the vessel because it had not been able
to do so “for some years.”357
The WCPFC assessed dozens of obligations and found the
Republic of Korea non-compliant with three obligations and

351. ICCAT, Report of the Compliance Committee, in 1 REPORT FOR THE BIENNIAL
PERIOD
2018–2019,
PART
I
673
(2019),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_18-19_I-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XZ5-V7C2].
352. The Compliance Committee noted that the Republic of Korea had not
submitted inspection reports for foreign vessels entering Korean ports, but Korea
responded that no foreign vessels fishing in ICCAT waters were entering Korean ports.
Id.
353. ICCAT, HISTORY OF PROHIBITIONS APPLIED UNDER REC. 11-15 COC-303-Annex
8,
https://www.iccat.int/com2020/Annex/COC_303_Annex_8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5P7-58KT] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
354. ICCAT, Report of the Compliance Committee, supra note 351, at 701.
355. Id. at 673, 701 (referencing COC-305/17 and COC-305/18, neither of which
are publicly accessible).
356. See, e.g., ICCAT, POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE AND RESPONSES—BFT VESSELS
ISSUES OF POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE REPORTS BY OBSERVERS UNDER THE ICCAT
REGIONAL OBSERVER PROGRAMS, Doc. No. COC-305_Appendix_2 (2020),
https://www.iccat.int/com2020/ENG/COC_305_APP2_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NH73-7G9U].
357. ICCAT, Report of the 12th Meeting of the Working Group on Integrated Monitoring
Measures (IMM), in 1 REPORT FOR THE BIENNIAL PERIOD 2018–2019: PART I 209 (2019),
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_18-19_I-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VKM5-MNB3].
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priority non-compliant for one in the 2018 fishing season.358 It
also found Chinese Taipei non-compliant with four obligations
but also “priority non-compliant” with two additional obligations
relating to transshipment reporting.359 Chinese Taipei is also
investigating non-compliance of its vessels in at least three
circumstances and the Republic of Korea in at least one.360 In the
2017 fishing season, the WCPFC found the Republic of Korea
non-compliant for four obligations, priority non-compliant for
five, and was conducting investigations into violations by at least
three vessels.361 It found Chinese Taipei to be priority noncompliant for five obligations and investigating violations by five
of its vessels.362
Both the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei are engaged
in “flag State investigations,”363 which are triggered when another
member believes a vessel of the flag State is fishing inconsistently
with a CMM.364 The flag State must report on the progress of the
investigations until it completes those investigations and takes any
remedial action.365 Because no information accompanies the
compliance reports, however, observers cannot determine on
what basis the investigations were initiated or how they were
resolved.
To obtain this kind of information, nongovernmental
organizations that attend RFMO meetings have sought greater

358. WCPFC, WCPFC16 Summary Report, supra note 323, at 222-23.
359. WCPFC CMM 2009-06 on transhipment provides that if transhipment occurs
on the high seas, CCMs must submit information to the WCPFC Executive Director at
least 36 hours prior to each transhipment and provide the Executive Director with a
WCPFC Transhipment Declaration within 15 days of completion of each transhipment.
WCPFC, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE ON THE REGULATION OF
TRANSHIPMENT
2009-06
7,
paras.
35(a)(iii)-(iv)
(2009),
https://www.wcpfc.int/file/227377/download?token=4vIGoE4A
[https://perma.cc/4G8B-VXRF]. It is these two obligations for which Chinese Taipei is
priority non-compliant due to failures to fulfill these obligations over multiple years.
WCPFC, WCPFC16 Summary Report, supra note 323, at 222-23.
360. Id. at 218-44.
361. WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE WCPFC’S FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING,
293-320
(May
4,
2019),
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC15%20Summary%20Report%202018_final
%20issued%204%20May%202019_optb.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM5U-RHK4].
362. Id.
363. WCPFC, WCPFC16 Summary Report, supra note 323, at 209.
364. WCPF Convention, supra note 23, art. 25(2).
365. WCPFC CMM 2019-06, supra note 255, ann. II.
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access to meetings concerning compliance.366 Members, however,
have blocked these efforts. The presence of observers in
discussions of compliance has been a very contentious issue. In
the WCPFC, for example, Palau has taken a very strong position
against observer participation in WCPFC compliance
discussions.367 Whether a large percentage of WCPFC members
also hold this view is not known; because Palau’s position is well
known, others likely do not consider it necessary to comment.
Also, members often make their views known to the chair in the
margins of the meeting so that they are not on record as opposing
observer participation.368 Only a small number of delegations
have been willing to voice support for observer participation.369
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite management of fish stocks by RFMOs, fish stocks
continue to decline.370 Poor management of fish stocks and IUU
fishing have both contributed to these declines.371 As the US
Coast Guard has noted, “[IUU] fishing is a pervasive security
threat to U.S. national interests. By undermining international
agreements and fisheries conservation measures, IUU fishing
jeopardizes global food security, with pronounced destabilizing
effects on vulnerable coastal States.”372
366. See, e.g., WCPFC, WCPFC16 Summary Report, supra note 323, para. 94.
367. See, e.g., WCPFC, REPORT OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL AND
COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEE,
para.
80
(2019),
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC16-2019TCC15%20TCC15%20Summary%20Report_issued%201%20December.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EUQ-T7XE] [hereinafter TCC15 Summary Report] (“Palau stated
that it had experienced problems in the past when observers released information that
was not necessarily accurate, but reflected that observers had also been very helpful.”).
368. WCPFC, REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL AND
COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEE
para.
81
(2018),
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/TCC14%20Summary%20Report%20Final_30%20
Nov.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77A-GU22] (“The Chair noted that requests had been
received to conduct the CMS review in closed session, in accordance with past practice.”).
369. WCPFC, TCC15 Summary Report, supra note 367, paras. 75-78 (reporting that
the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Indonesia spoke in favor of
including observers in compliance discussions).
370. See supra Section II.
371. FAO 2020, supra note 1, at vi (“In places where fisheries management is not in
place, or is ineffective, the status of fish stocks is poor and deteriorating.”).
372. U.S. COAST GUARD, ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING:
STRATEGIC
OUTLOOK
4
(2020),
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International organizations and RFMOs have noted the
critical importance of transparency for improving fisheries
management and combatting IUU fishing.373 Nonetheless, even
as RFMOs, including the IATTC, ICCAT, NPFC, and WCPFC,
build elaborate strategies for monitoring, control, and
surveillance of fisheries, they have largely failed to design
transparent mechanisms to ensure those mechanisms succeed.
For example, while these RFMOs require their members to
maintain a record of fishing vessels and for RFMO secretariats to
publish those records, they do not require submission of the
beneficial owners of the vessels. As a consequence, the beneficial
owners are able to hide behind shell corporations, making it
virtually impossible for prosecutors to identify the person
engaged in violation of the conservation and management
measures of RFMOs.374 In addition, while the WCPFC requires the
submission of vessel-specific fisheries data, other RFMOs do not;
in any event, these data, in addition to VMS data, are considered
strictly confidential.375 Moreover, despite the construction of
elaborate compliance regimes, they remain hidden behind walls
of confidentiality.376 What little information is made publicly
available is inscrutable; these RFMOs so report the bases for
finding an RFMO member compliant or non-compliant. IUU
fishing flourishes when information remains cloaked in secrecy,
and the long-term conservation of fish stocks consequently
suffers.
To combat IUU fishing and enhance the long-term
conservation of fish stocks, RFMOs must increase transparency
and, given the current state of global fish stocks, accelerate the
speed with which they develop more transparent processes.
Transparency “will help generate the behavioral change needed
to ensure thriving fish populations and the security of our
ocean.”377 With greater transparency, the veils of secrecy that hide

https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_2020_FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5T9Y-3UJ8].
373. See supra Section III. See also supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
374. See supra Section IV.A.
375. See supra Section IV.B-C.
376. See supra Section IV.D.
377. Tony Long, Track and Trace: Transparent and Digitized Fishing Data Is Crucial to
FISHING
WATCH
(June
3,
2020),
Ocean
Resilience,
GLOB.
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IUU fishing in Earth’s vast oceans will begin to fall, bringing those
fishers operating in the shadows into the light.

https://globalfishingwatch.org/news-views/ocean-resilience/
[https://perma.cc/M7F3-73Q2].
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